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Preface
Globalization is presumably the most significant economic development of the past
half century.
World’s leading politicians agreed on a common framework for international com-
merce and finance at the Bretton Woods Conference. The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund came into existence. The General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) was signed, pursuing the “substantial reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually
advantageous basis”. GATT led to the foundation of the World Trade Organization
and generated enormous economic integration. Today, the world map is covered
with economic unions (CSME, EU), customs and monetary unions (CEMAC, UE-
MOA), common markets (EEA, EFTA, CES), customs unions (CAN, EAC, ECU,
MERCOSUR,. . . ), and free trade areas (AFTA, CISFTA, COMESA, NAFTA,. . . ).
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) comprising twelve countries throughout the
Asia-Pacific region and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
between the EU and US are currently under negotiation. The OECD records an
increase of global trade from 1 trillion USD in 1970 to 17 trillion USD in 2013.1
The world economy experiences a profound transformation. This transformation
simultaneously affects firms, and is affected by their response itself. Firms are at
the same time spectators and creators of globalization. Theoretical research increas-
ingly emphasizes this mutual interdependence and explores global adjustments by
studying firm-level decisions.
The theoretical literature has been influenced by a number of empirical findings.
First, firms that participate in trade are larger, more productive, more capital in-
tensive, more skill intensive, and pay higher wages than domestic firms within the
same industry (e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), or Bernard et al. (2007a,b,
2009)). Second, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) find substantial reallocations of re-
1Annual world trade in goods and services measured in 2005 constant USD, OECD (2014).
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sources between firms within the same industry. Pavcnik (2002) and Trefler (2004)
find evidence that globalization reallocates resources away from less efficient domes-
tic firms towards more efficient exporters, and substantially changes the industry
composition. Third, larger aggregate trade flows are not only achieved via this in-
tensive margin, but also crucially depend on the extensive margin of the number of
exporting firms (e.g. Eaton et al. (2004), or Bernard et al. (2011)). Fourth, firms
respond to globalization along a number of dimensions including overall productiv-
ity, technology adoption, and markups of price over marginal cost (e.g. Pavcnik
(2002), Bustos (2011), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), or De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012)).
Models with heterogeneous firms provide a natural explanation for these features of
disaggregated trade data. Trade liberalization leads to within-industry reallocations
of resources. Less efficient firms exit and more efficient firms expand and enter export
markets. The average industry efficiency rises. The increase in firm scale induced by
export market entry enhances the return to complementary efficiency-enhancing in-
vestments, with the result that trade liberalization also raises firm efficiency. Models
with heterogeneous firms are important for understanding the predominant margins
along which an economy adjusts to globalization. They are important for exploring
distributional implications, and for analyzing aggregate outcomes. It is only under
strong conditions that aggregate outcomes (at the industry or country level) are
sufficient statistics for overall welfare gains from trade. And even when these strong
conditions hold heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models can have quite differ-
ent distributional implications. Especially from a policy perspective it is important
to identify potential winners and losers from globalization, to asses overall welfare
changes, and to generate counterfactual predictions for trade related interventions.
This dissertation contributes to this broad area of research. I explore new margins of
adjustment to trade. I explore distributional implications of trade in the presence of
aggregate shocks that have only been studied in stationary environments. I explore
the interaction of predominant forces shaping typical firm life cycles in a global
economy that have until now only been studied separately.
The first chapter is joined work with Gabriel Felbermayr. We investigate the inter-
action of firm specific default probabilities and globalization. While heterogeneity in
firm default risk is empirically obvious (e.g. substantial dispersion of credit default
swap rates), trade theory consistently imposes the simplifying assumption of iden-
tical exit rates for all firms. Jointly with partial irreversibility of investments, this
2
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new type of heterogeneity generates heterogeneity in effective discount rates and,
thus, in the cost of finance. As default probabilities are not perfectly observable
(there are only noisy signals), the model entails firm dynamics from learning and
belief updating. In line with evidence, the model predicts a negative correlation
between firms’ financing costs and their age. Over a firm’s life cycle, per period
net profits and the export participation probability grow. Exporters are less likely
to default than purely domestic firms. Belief updating entails excessive financing
of incumbents relative to entrants and too much exporting. Asymptotically, trade
liberalization reduces overall general equilibrium exit rates, but it does not neces-
sarily increase welfare. With multiple asymmetric export markets, firms gradually
expand their market coverage and total sales. A confidence crisis modeled by belief
reversion causes an over-proportional decrease in exports, thereby offering a novel
interpretation of the over-proportional trade slump during the world-wide recession
in 2008/2009.
The second chapter explores the dynamic response of a small open economy with
heterogeneous firms and labor market frictions on trade and technology shocks. I
study individual and aggregate firm dynamics, transitional wage rates, wage in-
equality, unemployment, and welfare.
There is direct job search. Firms compete for workers by publicly posting long-term
contracts. Job seekers observe all offers (determine expected wages and probabili-
ties of getting the job) and adjust their search accordingly. Convex vacancy costs
make firms expand gradually and provide a natural rationalization for the empirical
regularity that productivity distributions of exporters and non-exporters overlap
substantially. Conditional on age (or size), more productive firms exhibit higher
growth rates. Conditional on productivity, younger (or smaller) firms exhibit higher
growth rates. Firms realize higher growth rates by both, posting more vacancies and
filling each vacancy with a higher probability. Higher job-filling rates are realized
by higher wage offers, creating wage dispersion across and within firms.
I calibrate the model to typical figures of an open economy and study its dynamic
response to a trade liberalization and a positive technology shock. There are four
predominant types (and durations) of aggregate adjustments along the transition
path: Wage adjustments (immediate), firm adjustments (approx. 1.5 years), wage
distribution adjustments (approx. 10 years), and firm distribution adjustments (ap-
prox. 100 years). While a trade liberalization generates overshooting wage aver-
ages, a positive technology shock entails monotonically increasing averages. Both
3
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scenarios imply significant transitory inequalities. Variances of the aggregate wage
distribution overshoot substantially. While a trade liberalization pushes up unem-
ployment, a positive technology shock decreases the number of jobless workers. The
adjustment speed of unemployment after a positive technology shock is higher in
less open economies. A trade liberalization increases welfare. A positive technology
shock decreases welfare in more open economies and increases welfare in less open
ones.
The third chapter explores drivers of gradual firm growth and decay in a global
economy. I combine three separate approaches. First, there is supply uncertainty
leading to concave improvement of production techniques on firm level. Second,
there is demand uncertainty resulting in firm specific expansion paths. Third, there
are knowledge spillovers which constantly intensify competition and diminish firms
which do not improve their production technique sufficiently fast.
Each firm is assigned an unobservable productivity distribution upon its birth. This
distribution generates a new productivity sample every period. Whenever a new
productivity sample dominates the firms current productivity it switches technology
and produces according to this new productivity. This generates firm growth and
firm learning (from observing an ever-increasing sample history). Firm learning has
no effect on firm productivity, but it makes firms more or less optimistic about their
future productivity evolution, and via this channel influences market entry/exit
decisions. Furthermore, each firm is assigned an unobservable per period demand
shock probability for every country. Demand is either positive or - when hit by a
shock - completely vanishes. Firms can learn about these market specific default
probabilities by various means. As demand characteristics are positively correlated
across countries, firm learning for a specific country also comprises observing demand
signals in other countries. Firm specific demand signals entail firm specific learning
and result in firm specific expansion paths. However, generally, more productive
firms enter more markets. This generates a positive correlation of firm productivity
and life expectancy. Finally, there are knowledge spillovers from incumbent firms to
entrants. Start-ups draw their productivity type from a distribution that depends
on the productivity type distribution of existing firms. This generates monotonically
increasing average productivities and results in crowding out of old firms.
Each chapter is self-contained. Technical discussions are deferred to Appendices in
the second part of this thesis. A comprehensive bibliography is provided at the end.
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Chapter I
A Simple Theory of Trade,
Finance, and Firm Dynamics*
I.1 Introduction
Recent theoretical work pioneered by Melitz (2003) has shed light on the role of
productivity heterogeneity for the effect of international trade on firm behavior and
aggregate outcomes. Given the presence of fixed costs, only more productive firms
sort into exporting, and a reduction of trade costs increases aggregate productiv-
ity. Similar selection effects can be derived from firm-level differences in perceived
product quality (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011) or the degree of tradability of output
(Bergin and Glick, 2009). The core prediction of these models, namely that more
competitive firms are more likely to be exporters, enjoys massive empirical support
(Bernard et al., 2007a). A smaller strand of theoretical work introduces heterogene-
ity regarding fixed market access costs into the Krugman (1980) framework while
keeping marginal revenues constant across firms (e.g. Schmitt and Yu (2001), or
Jorgenson and Schro¨der (2008)).
Unrecognized in the recent trade literature, firms also differ with respect to their
exit probabilities, at least as perceived by financial markets.1 Ashcraft and Santos
(2009) study data on credit default swaps and document a remarkable degree of
heterogeneity amongst firms with respect to their perceived risk of business discon-
tinuation. The Melitz (2003) model does not capture this stylized fact, since at
*This chapter is based on joint work with Gabriel Felbermayr published in the Review of
International Economics, Felbermayr and Spiegel (2014).
1Pflu¨ger and Russek (2011) are the only exception known to us: they use a two-sector Melitz
(2003) model where exit probabilities are assumed to be inversely related to firm-level productivity.
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each period, all firms are equally likely to be hit by a death shock. Plant death
is important for aggregate statistics: Bernard and Jensen (2007) show that plant
deaths account for more than half of gross job destruction in U.S. manufacturing.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first conducting a thorough analysis of this
relevant and ubiquitous source of firm heterogeneity and its implications.
The core purpose of this chapter is to explore the effect of heterogeneous default
probabilities on individual firm life cycles and on aggregate outcomes. Apart from
the introduction of this new type of heterogeneity, we leave everything else as stan-
dard as possible. This allows isolating and analyzing the two driving forces – the
cleansing mechanism and the updating mechanism – in a well known and understood
environment. In our model, we continue to assume that firms are uniquely identified
by the single product they produce. Also, as Melitz (2003), we view business dis-
continuation as a discrete exogenous shock.2 However, we allow firms to differ with
respect to the probability of such death shocks. Upon developing a new product,
firms trigger uncertain, publicly observable signals about the viability of their new
product (i.e., their type), yielding beliefs that are correct in expectation and that
are updated according to Bayes’ law in case of firm survival. In the presence of par-
tial irreversibility of investment, this assumption implies firm-level differences with
respect to their cost of finance.3 As in Melitz (2003), in our framework, firms are
identical ex ante. The financial markets are risk neutral and perfectly competitive.
However, the ‘true’ life expectancy of a firm is unknown to all agents (i.e., to pro-
ducers, financial markets, consumers). At the beginning of each period, producers
must invest a fixed cost which cannot be recovered at any stage and which depreci-
ates at the end of the period. Assuming, without loss of generality, that funds are
available at a zero baseline interest rate, a firm’s effective financing cost is equal to
its per-period exit probability. If a firm survives, at the end of the period, market
participants update their believed exit rates downwards. So, as time elapses, the
funding of fixed cost activities (such as exporting) becomes gradually cheaper.
Firms’ marginal revenues remain constant over time, so that the model enjoys the
tractability of Schmitt and Yu (2001). However, despite its simplicity, the setup
generates additional insights that are not available in the Melitz (2003) framework.
2We are silent about the exact source of the shock. It may be due to the the sudden disap-
pearance of demand, due to the emergence of a cheaper perfect substitute of the firm’s variety, or
due to a technology shock causing the immediate depreciation of the firm’s assets.
3Impullitti, Irarrazabal and Oppromolla (2013) use a Melitz (2003) model with a stochastic
evolution of productivity and irreversibility of investment. They provide a rich discussion of the
empirical importance of sunk costs in trade related applications.
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As only firms with sufficiently low exit hazards enter foreign markets, exporters
are on average longer-lived than domestic firms. Trade liberalization allows those
formerly domestic firms with lowest effective interest rates to take up exporting while
domestic firms, facing high interest rates, are forced to exit. So, trade liberalization
lowers the expected average survival time of exporters but increases that of domestic
firms. Due to a composition effect, in the overall economy, expected average survival
increases. Hence, liberalization leads to higher ex- post stability of firms in the long
run, but effects differ between exporters and domestic firms.
The model also yields insights about firm and firm-generation dynamics. Recent
literature studies the dynamic behavior of firms in open economies. The common
objective is to explain the obvious stylized fact that firms are not typically born as
exporters but evolve into exporting, and possibly out of it, over time. Dynamics may
arise from the evolution of firm types. Impulliti, Irarrazabal and Oppromolla (2013)
work with productivity shocks and irreversible investment in an otherwise standard
Melitz (2003) model. Fajgelbaum (2011) stresses labor market frictions. Burstein
and Melitz (2012) analyze the role of innovation. Alternatively, dynamics may also
arise from learning about foreign markets or foreign customers. Nguyen (2012)
studies the role of uncertainty about foreign market demand; Albornoz et al. (2012)
offer a model of sequential exporting where firms gradually learn about foreign
market profitability; Araujo et al. (2012) investigate the build up of trust between
a producer and the foreign client in the absence of complete contracts.4 In our model,
uncertainty concerns the type of the producer or, equivalently, characteristics of the
product, the ‘true’ economic life expectancy of a firm or product being unknown to
all market participants. Dynamics are driven by two very simple mechanisms; the
cleansing mechanism: inferior firms are more likely to default, and the updating
mechanism: trust in firms increases in firm age.
The cleansing mechanism yields firm generation dynamics. As firms with high exit
probability default more likely, the type distribution of firm generations evolves
over time. Average exit probabilities of firm generations decrease with respect to
their age, yielding decreasing average discount rates, increasing average net profits
and an increasing fraction of exporters. The updating mechanism is driven by
type uncertainty and the resulting Bayesian updating, yielding similar firm specific
dynamics as the cleansing mechanism implies for firm generations. The older a
firm, the lower the discount rate it is being assigned, yielding lower costs of finance,
4Aeberhardt et al. (2011) also study learning in the context of contract incompleteness.
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increasing net profits and increasing probability of exporting. Besides, as firms
anticipate these life cycle patterns, there are some firms that enter the domestic
market realizing negative profits initially.5 In contrast, on the export market such
early entries do not occur as active firms can wait until belief updating pushes their
discount rate below the threshold ensuring positive profits.
Even though belief updating is rational on the individual level of the firm, the joint
analysis of the cleansing and updating mechanisms reveals that updating leads to
misvaluation of firm generation averages. While the evolution of true average exit
probabilities is solely driven by the cleansing mechanism, the evolution of perceived
average exit probabilities is driven by both, the the cleansing mechanism and the up-
dating mechanism. Thus, the older a firm generation gets, the further perceived and
true magnitudes drift apart. Average discount rates of incumbents are inefficiently
small, yielding excessive financing of incumbents relative to entrants (innovators).
As incumbents and entrants compete for workforce, this yields insufficient entry of
new firms. A corollary of this is that belief updating implies excessive exporting: If
a firm enters the export market by a misjudgment of its type, it will, in expectation,
default before accumulated profits balance exporting fixed costs, yielding a negative
welfare effect.
The predictions of our model are consistent with a number of empirical stylized
facts. First, firm survival and export status are positively correlated (Greenaway et
al., 2008), the link between the two running through access to finance (Goerg and
Spaliara, 2009). Second, over longer horizons of time, about 40% of total export
growth occurs at the extensive margin (Bernard and Jensen, 2004). Third, over
time, firms gradually expand the number of export markets that they serve (Lawless,
2009). Fourth, export activities are heavily persistent due to the existence of sunk
costs (Das et al., 2007).6
We use the model to study a crisis of confidence, in which market participants revise
their beliefs, i.e., they delete a portion of the updating history. Since type beliefs
of exporters are on average farther away from true types, this revision leads to a
5Belief updating requires that the firm is active, i.e., producing, and therefore observed by
market participants.
6An evident extension of our model could allow firms to accumulate tangible assets over their
life cycle. But as this variation would only amplify the mechanisms at hand, via accelerating the
reduction of financing costs in firm age, we omit it for the sake of simplicity. One could also think
about evolution of true types, rather than fixing them to their initial value. However, again this
would not change our results qualitatively as long as new types are positively correlated with old
ones.
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stronger decline in exports and, by trade balance, of imports relative to domestic
sales. Credit conditions of large old firms (exporters) deteriorate more strongly than
of small young ones. These observations are in line with the effect of the Lehman
Brothers crash on September 15, 2008. This shock led to a tightening of credit
restrictions, in particular of large firms, and to a collapse of trade. As documented
in survey data from Germany and other countries, the ordering of perceived credit
constraints of small, medium size, and large firms were reversed by that shock and
has slowly returned to the pre-crisis pattern afterwards.7
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section I.2 describes the basic
framework. Section I.3 derives our core results under the simplifying assumption
that firms’ expected life times are known with certainty after entry. Section I.4
extends the analysis to the more realistic case of uncertain default probabilities.
Section I.5 concludes.
I.2 Setup
We analyze an infinitely repeated game of symmetric information. All transactions
(costs, revenues, profits,. . . ) are measured in units of the final good. To present our
new mechanisms as clearly as possible, we chose a basic modeling framework that
remains close to Melitz (2003).
Households
We consider n + 1 symmetric countries. We relax symmetry in the third part of
Section I.4. Each country is populated by a representative household of size L, who
supplies labor inelastically, and who cares about the quantity of a final good C
according to a linear utility function. Hence, per capita utility is u = C/L.
Production
In each country, there is a mass M of monopolistically competitive producers of
differentiated intermediate inputs, indexed by ω. These inputs are assembled by a
perfectly competitive final goods sector into the final good Y according to the CES
7Our model is too stylized to be used for a full quantitative analysis of the crisis. Rather, we
wish to highlight a novel theoretical mechanism that may have played a role along more standard
determinants such as the strong decline in demand.
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production function:8
Y =
(∫
q(ω)ρdω
)1/ρ
= C + I, ρ ∈ (0, 1). (I.1)
The final good Y = C + I can be either consumed by households or used as in-
vestment by firms. While the final good is freely tradable, differentiated inputs
are subject to standard iceberg trade costs τ ≥ 1. Standard manipulation yields
optimal input demands of final goods producers and associated expenditures:
q(ω) = Q
(p(ω)
P
)−σ
and r(ω) = R
(p(ω)
P
)1−σ
, (I.2)
with σ = 1/(1 − ρ) > 1 and Dixit Stiglitz aggregates P , Q and R. The index P
constitutes the associated price of the final output good, normalized to unity by
choice of numeraire, Q constitutes the quantity index, and R is given by R = PQ =
Y . Input goods are produced via a one-to-one technology, q = ℓ, with labor ℓ being
the only factor of production. As firms do not differ in productivity they charge
identical prices, pd on the domestic and px on the export markets:
pd =
w
ρ
, and px = τpd, (I.3)
where w denotes the wage rate. Thus, domestic per period operating profits and
revenues are identical for all firms and are given by:
πd = (pd − w)qd =
( wqd
σ − 1
)
, and rd = pdqd = σπd, (I.4)
with analogous expressions for exporters.
Heterogeneity
Firm heterogeneity is introduced via firm specific per period exit probabilities δ ∈
[0, 1], distributed with pdf g(δ) and cdf G(δ). Per period exit probabilities are con-
stant over firms’ life time. In Section I.3 we assume that start-up investments reveal
true types δ of firms, thereby deactivating the updating mechanism and isolating the
dynamics generated by the cleansing mechanism. Then, from Section I.4 onwards,
we drop this assumption and analyze the full dynamics triggered by the cleansing
and the updating mechanisms. From Section I.4 onwards, the start-up investment
triggers an uncertain signal of the firms exit probability that is correct in expecta-
tion. This uncertainty yields perceived types δˆ that are updated according to Bayes’
law as the firm grows older while true types δ do not change over time.9
8This expression admits external economies of scale; neutralizing them as Egger and Kreicke-
meier (2009) has no qualitative bearing on our results.
9For a detailed discussion of perceived types and Bayesian updating refer to section I.4
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Financial Market
We consider a risk neutral, perfectly competitive financial market and normalize
the interest rate required by households to zero. Thus, in case of revealed types, a
firm δ is charged a per period rate of δα for a loan with nominal α, yielding zero
expected profits for creditors.10 Analogously, in case of type uncertainty, a firm of
perceived type δˆ is charged δˆα. As in Melitz (2003), firms only invest if investment
costs are balanced by returns to investment in expectations.
Timing
Each period t ∈ N consists of three stages: s = 1 : Inactive firms may turn active
by sinking K units of the final output good into research and development. This
effort yields a new variety of the differentiated input for sure, but the viability of
the innovation δ is drawn from g(δ) and differs across firms. The market receives
signals that reveal true firm types δ (Section I.3), or that yield certain beliefs of
firm types δˆ (Section I.4). s = 2 : Active firms consider to either turn inactive or to
sell on the domestic market (at market access costs fd), or to additionally engage
in exporting (at market access costs fx). s = 3 : Active firms may be forced to
exit the market by idiosyncratic shocks, that arrive according to their per period
exit probability δ, and turn inactive. Survivors remain active, generate profits and
conduct loan rate repayments. In case of type uncertainty (Section I.4), beliefs are
updated contingent on firm survival.
Aggregation
A long-run equilibrium is characterized by a mass M and a type distribution h(δ)
of active firms and a mass Mx and a type distribution hx(δ) of exporters in every
country. As all active firms charge the same domestic price pd and all exporters
charge the same price px for their exports, we have:
1 = P =
(∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σdω
)1/(1−σ)
=
(∫ 1
0
p1−σd Mh(δ)dδ+n
∫ 1
0
p1−σx Mxhx(δ)dδ
)1/(1−σ)
= (Mp1−σd + nMxp
1−σ
x )
1/(1−σ), (I.5)
10Here we restrict our analysis to sunk fixed costs, that can not be recovered subsequent to firm
default. One could additionally introduce a component that is not sunk. As additional insights
are small – if more units of final good are needed for investment, aggregate consumption decreases,
but idiosyncratic interest rates of firms are not affected – we simply assume sunkness of fixed costs
for the purpose of technical simplicity.
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by choice of numeraire. Analogously we get Q = (Mqρd + nMxq
ρ
x)
1/ρ and R =
Mrd + nMxrx.
I.3 Cleansing Mechanism
In this section we focus on the cleansing mechanism and its impact on firm gener-
ation dynamics. The updating mechanism is switched off by assuming perfect ob-
servability of firm types. Additionally, we assume g(0) = 0, i.e. no firm shall be able
to survive all possible shocks. We denote expected values with respect to a certain
distribution χ by Eχ(·) and impose the technical assumption Eg(1/δ) ∈ (1,∞).
11
Zero Cut-Off Profit Conditions
Market access costs fd and fx are modeled as flow fixed costs which occur at the
beginning of each period and which are sunk until the end of the period. So, in
case of firm default they are lost and in case of firm survival firms repay them at
the end of the period, and apply for new loans at the beginning of the next period.
As the financial market is risk neutral and perfectly competitive an active firm of
type δ faces per period loan rates of δPfd = δfd, plus nδfx in case of exporting.
Thus, domestic entry occurs only if per period operating profits πd dominate per
period loan rates δfd, yielding πd = δ
∗
dfd, with δ
∗
d denoting the domestic cut-off type.
Analogously we get πx = δ
∗
xfx, with the exporting cut-off type δ
∗
x. As per period
operating profits earned at each market do not depend on firm type we have:
πd = δ
∗
dfd and πx = δ
∗
xfx, (I.6)
for all firms. Importantly, per period net profits do depend on firm types as loan
rate repayments δfd for domestic market entry and δfx for foreign market entry are
type-dependent. Thus, a firm of type δ ≤ δ∗d realizes per period net profits of:
πn(δ) =
{
πnd (δ) = πd − δfd = (δ
∗
d − δ)fd if δ ∈ (δ
∗
x, δ
∗
d],
πnd (δ) + nπ
n
x(δ) = (δ
∗
d − δ)fd + n(δ
∗
x − δ)fx if δ ∈ (0, δ
∗
x].
(I.7)
Dividing domestic and exporting per period profits and applying (I.2) and (I.3), we
get a one-to-one correspondence between cut-off types δ∗x and δ
∗
d:
δ∗xfx
δ∗dfd
=
πx
πd
= τ 1−σ ⇒ δ∗x = τ
1−σ fd
fx
δ∗d. (I.8)
11The restriction Eg(1/δ) <∞ is equivalent to requiring that the density g(δ) converges faster
than linearly towards zero as its argument δ converges against the boundary δ → 0. The restriction
Eg(1/δ) > 1 precludes convergence towards the degenerate density that assigns all probability to
the outcome δ = 1.
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To ensure that all active firms serve their domestic market and only a subset of
domestically active firms engages in exporting, we assume fx ≥ fd.
12
Free Entry Condition
As firm types are unobservable ex ante, firms are not able to offer banks the repay-
ment of a fixed nominal in order to be granted the loan needed for carrying out the
start-up investment K. If, for example, the firm turns out to be of the domestic
cut-off type δ∗d, it will realize zero per period net profits and hence will not be able to
deduct any positive rate payments. Therefore, firms offer the repayment of a type
dependent nominal α(δ) that has to be less than their expected total net profits
α(δ) ≤ Σ∞t=0(1 − δ)
tπn(δ) = πn(δ)/δ. Banks accept only if they do not incur losses
in expectation. Given that start-up investment costs K are sunk and that only a
fraction G(δ∗d) of new firms is able to enter the market, the above inequality can
be rephrased as Eg(α(δ)|δ ≤ δ
∗
d) ≥ K/G(δ
∗
d). As banks face perfect competition,
this inequality is binding. Free entry of firms drives down profits until nominal and
expected total net profits coincide α(δ) = πn(δ)/δ, leaving firms with zero profits
and yielding:
Eg(π
n(δ)/δ|δ ≤ δ∗d) = K/G(δ
∗
d). (I.9)
In the Appendix we prove that cut-off values δ∗d and δ
∗
x exist and are uniquely deter-
mined by (I.7), (I.8) and (I.9). Moreover, we also prove the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 (Trade Liberalization and Firm Churning). A reduction in variable
trade costs τ lowers δ∗d but increases δ
∗
x. Trade liberalization yields lower average
firm churning, while churning of exporters increases.
Incumbent Distribution
In expectation, low-δ-firms drop out from the market later than high-δ-firms. Thus,
the incumbent distribution h(δ) differs from the distribution of start-ups g(δ). Ev-
ery period a certain measure Me of g-distributed firms tries to enter the market
(henceforth denoted as firm generation), yielding a certain measure Meg(δ) of en-
trants per type δ. Let i(δ) denote the measure of incumbents of type δ, then firms of
type δ accumulate until the measure of entrants Meg(δ) coincides with the measure
of defaulting firms δi(δ), yielding i(δ) = Meg(δ)/δ. Thus, the type distribution of
12A similar condition ensure the empirically relevant sorting pattern in the Melitz (2003) model.
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incumbents is given by:13
h(δ) =


g(δ)/δ
∫ δ∗
d
0 g(δ)/δ dδ
if δ ∈ (0, δ∗d],
0 otherwise.
(I.10)
Correspondingly the type distribution of exporters follows h(δ|δ ≤ δ∗x). As h(δ)
shifts mass towards low values of δ, average turnover of firms entering the market
Eg(δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
d) is higher than average market turnover Eh(δ). Summarizing, we obtain
the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Cleansing Mechanism). The older a firm generation, the lower its
average exit probability.
As loan rates, size of net profits and entry into exporting are determined by firms
exit probabilities, we can directly infer
Proposition 3 (Firm Generation Effects). The older a firm generation, the lower
its average loan rate, the higher its average net profit and the higher its fraction of
exporters.
With δ∗d, δ
∗
x and h(δ) characterized, now we close the model by determining firm
masses and per period consumption.
Firm Masses
In steady state, firm entry balances firm exit, yielding Me = Eh(δ)M/G(δ
∗
d). Us-
ing labor market clearing L = Mqd + nMxτqx and the relative mass of exporting
firms Mx = H(δ
∗
x)M , with H(δ) denoting the cumulative density function of the
incumbent distribution h(δ), we get:
M = wL/[(σ − 1)(fdδ
∗
d + fxnH(δ
∗
x)δ
∗
x)], (I.11)
which is a first relation linking the two remaining unknown endogenous variablesM
and w. A detailed derivation of (I.11) is provided in the Appendix.
13As we imposed the assumption Eg(1/δ) <∞, the density g(δ) converges faster than linearly
towards zero if δ becomes arbitrarily small. This ensures the existence of h(δ).
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Consumption
We can determine the equilibrium wage rate w from P = 1, obtaining aggregate per
period consumption:
C = Lw/P = Lw = Lρ(M + nH(δ∗x)Mτ
1−σ)1/(σ−1), (I.12)
a second relation linking M and w. As utility is linear in consumption, (I.12)
constitutes a measure of welfare. Again, a detailed derivation of (I.12) is provided
in the Appendix. From the measure of entering firms and the fixed costs they have to
bear, we can directly determine the quantity of the final product spent for start-up
investments and market entries every period:
I = (K + fdG(δ
∗
d) + nfxG(δ
∗
x))Me. (I.13)
From (I.2) and (I.3) we get τpx = τ
1−σqd < qd. Thus, trade liberalization increases
the number of available varieties in every country. Moreover, trade liberalization
increases average productivity. Proposition 1 establishes that trade liberalization
forces firms with low net profits out of the market (δˆ decreases) shifting production
towards more efficient firms. As per period net profits constitute the difference of
per period profits (that are independent of firm type) and per period fixed costs
(that decrease in length of firm life), trade liberalization raises Y − I = C and we
get:
Proposition 4 (Trade Liberalization and Welfare). Trade liberalization increases
welfare.
I.4 Uncertain Firm Types and Updating
In this section, we discuss variations and applications of our simple baseline model
from above. First, we introduce type uncertainty, leaving everything else unchanged
(first subsection), then we discuss consequences of a confidence crisis (second subsec-
tion) and conclude with the analysis of the asymmetric country case (third subsec-
tion). Henceforth start-up investments trigger uncertain signals, yielding perceived
types δˆt=0 ∈ [0, 1]. When referring to the cross section of firms we drop the age
indicating subscript and denote perceived types with δˆ. Perceived types δˆ consti-
tute expected values of their corresponding belief δ ∼ bδˆ(δ), i.e. Ebδˆ(δ) = δˆ. Initial
perceived types δˆt=0 are correct in expectation. Thus, perceived and true types are
both distributed with the true type pdf g introduced in Section I.3 initially. Again,
15
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we impose the technical assumption Eb
δˆ
(1/δ) ∈ (1,∞) for all δˆ.14 Turning to the
perceived type evolution of individual firms, we can frame a very simple mechanism.
Every period a firm survives, its perceived type is being updated according to Bayes’
law until it is hit by a shock and forced to exit the market. As updating is only
triggered by good news (firm survival), we get δˆ0 > δˆ1 > · · · > δˆt > . . . for all peri-
ods a firm survives, with δˆt denoting its perceived type in its t
th period subsequent
foundation. To understand this mechanism more closely, consider a firm with a very
poor start-up signal. Initially agents expect the firm to default with a high proba-
bility. The longer the firm survives, the less the agents will trust in the accuracy of
its start-up signal and correct the perceived default probability downwards. In the
limit, the firm could only survive for an infinite number of periods if its true type
was δ = 0. Thus, perceived type evolutions (δˆa)a≤t constitute segments of length t
of monotonically decreasing sequences that start at δˆ0 and converge towards zero,
limt→∞δˆt = 0. This updating mechanism is a direct implication of type uncertainty.
It is solely driven by dropping the additional assumption of section I.3 that firms
default probabilities are perfectly observable.15
Proposition 5 (Updating Mechanism). The older a firm, the lower its perceived
exit probability.
Symmetric Countries
Except from the type uncertainty introduced above, the setup from Section I.3
remains unchanged.
Zero Cut-Off Profit Conditions
As loans for market access costs are negotiated on a per period basis, firms face
rate payments δˆtfd (plus nδˆtfx in case of exporting) that always reflect current firm
14The restriction Eb
δˆ
(1/δ) <∞ is equivalent to requiring that the density b
δˆ
(δ) converges faster
than linearly towards zero as its argument δ converges against the boundary δ → 0. The restriction
Eb
δˆ
(1/δ) > 1 precludes convergence towards the degenerate density that assigns all probability to
the outcome δ = 1.
15A signal is produced only at the moment of firm creation. If we suppress this signal we would
loose firm heterogeneity within firm generations. All firms of the same generation would initially
be assigned a perceived type matching the expected value of the true type distribution. This
perceived type would simultaneously drop for all survivors of that generation and slowly converge
towards zero as the age of the generation approaches infinity. Another possibility is to introduce
more signals. Yet this would not qualitatively change the result of decreasing perceived types. No
matter how many signals we introduce, firm survival will always constitute relevant information
for the updating process and bias it downwards.
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status δˆt. Thus, the older a firm the lower its rate payments. As firms anticipate
this life cycle pattern, the entry decision arises from comparing present value of
expected future profits with present value of expected future costs. Hence, some
firms enter even though they are facing negative per period net profits initially.
Consider a firm with initial perceived type δˆ0, then present value of expected fu-
ture profits from domestic activity equals Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1 − δ)
tπ(δˆt)) = Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1 −
δ)tπd + Σ
∞
t=t(δˆ0)
(1 − δ)tnπx) = Eb
δˆ0
(1/δ)πd + Eb
δˆ0
((1 − δ)t(δˆ0)/δ)nπx, with t(δˆ0) de-
noting the period of entry into exporting in case of survival. Let ψ(δˆ0) denote the
weighted probability of survival until entry into exporting. It is defined by the con-
dition satisfying Eb
δˆ0
(ψ(δˆ0)/δ) = Eb
δˆ0
((1 − δ)t(δˆ0)/δ). Then, the present value of
expected future profits can be rewritten as Eb
δˆ0
(1/δ)(πd + ψ(δˆ0)nπx). The present
value of expected future costs from domestic entry equals Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1 − δ)
tδˆtfd +
Σ∞
t=t(δˆ0)
(1 − δ)tnδˆtfx) = Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1 − δ)
tδ¯(δˆ0)fd + Σ
∞
t=t(δˆ0)
(1 − δ)tnδ¯(δˆt(δˆ0))fx) =
Eb
δˆ0
(1/δ)(δ¯(δˆ0)fd + ψ(δˆ0)nδ¯(δˆt(δˆ0))fx), with δ¯(δˆ) denoting the expected future av-
erage perceived type of a firm with perceived type δˆ.16 For the cut-off value δˆ∗d,
present value of expected future profits and present value of expected future costs
coincide, yielding πd+ψ(δˆ
∗
d)nπx = δ¯(δˆ
∗
d)fd+ψ(δˆ
∗
d)nδ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
))fx. Differently, in case of
exporting, firms wait until their perceived type is low enough to realize positive per
period net profits from exporting. As domestic and exporting per period operating
profits do not depend on firm type we get:
πd = δ¯(δˆ
∗
d)fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
)))nfx and πx = δˆ
∗
xfx. (I.14)
Even if the probability of exporting was zero ψ(δˆ∗d) = 0, firms δˆ0 ∈ (δ¯(δˆ
∗
d), δˆ
∗
d] would
realize negative net profits (δ¯(δˆ∗d) − δˆ0)fd < 0 initially, speculating on positive net
profits (δ¯(δˆ∗d)−δˆt)fd > 0 in future periods. The prospect of positive exporting profits
lowers initial profits even further. A firm of age t and perceived type δˆt realizes a
per period net profit of:
πn(δˆt) =
{
πnd (δˆt) = πd − δˆtfd if δˆt ∈ (δˆ
∗
x, δˆ
∗
d],
πnd (δˆt) + nπ
n
x(δˆt) = πd − δˆtfd + n(πx − δˆtfx) if δˆt ∈ (0, δˆ
∗
x].
(I.15)
16As δˆt decreases monotonically in t, the expected amount of cleared entry costs Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1−
δ)tδˆtfd) < Eb
δˆ0
(1/δ)δˆ0fd < ∞ is finite by assumption Eb
δˆ
(1/δ) ∈ (1,∞). Thus, there exists a
unique δ¯(δˆ0) ∈ (0, δˆ0) fulfilling Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tδˆtfd) = Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tδ¯(δˆ0)fd). Existence and
uniqueness of δ¯(δˆ
t(δˆ0)
) holds analogously.
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Dividing domestic and exporting per period operating profits and applying (I.2) and
(I.3), we get a one-to-one correspondence between δˆ∗x and δˆ
∗
d:
δˆ∗xfx
δ¯(δˆ∗d)fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
)))nfx
=
πx
πd
=
qx
qd
(px − τw
pd − w
)
= τ 1−σ
⇒ δˆ∗x = τ
1−σ
δ¯(δˆ∗d)fd + ψ(δˆ
∗
d)δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
))nfx
(1 + τ 1−σψ(δˆ∗d)n)fx
. (I.16)
Summarizing, the updating mechanism from proposition 5 yields:
Proposition 6 (Firm Specific Effects). Net profits of firms and ex-ante probability
of exporting increase in firm age. Some firms face negative per period net profits
from domestic activity initially, while entry into exporting occurs only in case of
positive per period net profits.
Free Entry Condition
In line with the known firm type case, firms offer the repayment of their signal
dependent expected total net profits Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tπn(δˆt)) and risk neutral, per-
fectly competitive banks grant loans until expected profits coincide with expected
costs:
Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tπn(δˆt))|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d) = K/G(δˆ
∗
d). (I.17)
In the Appendix we prove that cut-off values δˆ∗d and δˆ
∗
x exist and are uniquely
determined by (I.14), (I.15), (I.16) and (I.17). Moreover, we prove that lower iceberg
trade costs τ lower δˆ∗d but increase δˆ
∗
x, yielding identical trade liberalization effects
on firm churning as in the known firm type case (Proposition 1).
Incumbent Distributions
First we determine the steady state distribution of true types and then, second,
the steady state distribution of perceived types. Every period a certain mea-
sure Me of firms with g-distributed true types tries to enter the market. As true
types are not observable, even high-δ-firms may enter if their start-up signal is
sufficiently good, i.e. if δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d, yielding the modified distribution of entrants
j(δ) =
∫ δˆ∗
d
0
bδˆ0(δ)g(δˆ0)dδˆ0. Let i(δ) denote the aggregate mass of incumbents of type
δ. Then firms of true type δ accumulate until the measure of entrants, Mej(δ), co-
incides with the measure of defaulting firms δi(δ) yielding i(δ) = Mej(δ)/δ. Thus,
18
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we get the true type distribution of incumbents:
h(δ) =
j(δ)/δ∫ 1
0
j(δ)/δ dδ
. (I.18)
Perceived types of entrants are distributed with g(δˆ0|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d) and evolve according
to the Bayesian updating process subsequently. Thus, if we fix a perceived type δˆ
and want to determine the density of incumbents for this perceived type, we have
to consider two components: new entrants with perceived type δˆ0 = δˆ and older
firms that started with a start-up perceived type δˆ′0 > δˆ and happen to be assigned
a current perceived type δˆ by Bayesian updating. Let δˆ−t > δˆ denote the start-up
perceived type that coincides with δˆ after t periods of Bayesian updating. Then, the
entry density of perceived type δˆ−t equals Meg(δˆ−t) and the probability that firms
of this perceived type survive for t periods is given by Eb
δˆ
−t
((1 − δ)t) yielding the
perceived type density of incumbents jˆ(δˆ) = Σ
T (δˆ)
t=0 Ebδˆ
−t
((1 − δ)t)Meg(δˆ−t).
17 Thus,
we get the perceived type distribution of incumbents:
hˆ(δˆ) =


jˆ(δˆ)
∫ δˆ∗
d
0 jˆ(δˆ) dδˆ
if δˆ ∈ (0, δˆ∗d],
0 otherwise.
(I.19)
Misvaluation of Active Firms
On individual firm level belief updating is rational. Per construction the perceived
type δˆt denotes the best approximation of the firms true type conditional on the
start-up signal δˆ0 and the information that the firm did not default for t periods.
As financing is conducted at the firm level, the perfectly competitive financial market
imposes the interest rate δˆt. However, this leads to misvaluation in aggregate terms.
Consider a new-born firm generation. As start-up signals are correct in expectation,
the true and the perceived average type of this firm generation coincides initially.
Both decline with respect to generation age by excess exit of high-δ-types according
to the cleansing mechanism. But as the decline of perceived types is amplified by the
updating mechanism, the average perceived type is increasingly biased downwards
the older the firm generation gets. So, incumbents face interest rates that are too
small in expectation, and too many firms become exporters.18 Still, the financial
17As g(0) = 0, only perceived types δˆ > 0 are possible. And as limt→∞(δˆ
∗
d)t = 0, there always
exists a finite t s.t. (δˆ∗d)t < δˆ. Thus, T (δˆ) is finite for all δˆ > 0.
18If a firm with true type δ > δˆ∗x enters the export market by a misjudgement of its type δˆt ≤ δˆ
∗
x,
it will (in expectation) default before sunk entry costs nfx are balanced by accumulated per period
net profits.
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market does not incur losses in aggregate. Free entry and the financing of the
start-up investment take those misvaluations into account. However, as start-ups
and incumbents compete on the labor market, the relative prevalence of incumbents
yields too little entry and thus decreases overall welfare. It might be a concern that
this misvaluation is at odds with general equilibrium conditions. Yet all we need is
the stationarity of true and perceived type distributions which is discussed in the
previous paragraph. It is not necessary that they coincide. As the perceived type δˆt
denotes the best estimate of a firms’ true type no agent has an incentive to deviate
from this belief. Summarizing, the joint impact of the cleansing mechanism from
Proposition 2 and the updating mechanism from Proposition 5 implies:
Proposition 7 (Firm Generation Effects). The older a firm generation, the fur-
ther perceived and true average exit probabilities deviate, yielding inefficiently low
interest rates for incumbents. Thus, the steady state exhibits excessive exporting and
insufficient start-up investment.
The misvaluation in aggregate figures is inherent to the model structure and results
from perfectly rational valuations by individual firms.19 The simplest way to deal
with the resulting excessive prevalence of incumbents is to introduce a tax on op-
erating profits that increases in firm age and to use the tax revenue to subsidize
start-ups. Firm type generation effects from the known type case (Proposition 3)
carry over to the uncertain firm type case.
Firm Masses
In steady state, firm entry balances firm exit, yielding Me = Eh(δ)M/G(δˆ
∗
d). Using
labor market clearing L = Mqd + nMxτqx and the mass of exporting firms Mx =
Hˆ(δˆ∗x)M , with Hˆ(δˆ) denoting the cumulative density function of the incumbent
distribution hˆ(δˆ), we get:
M = wL/[(σ − 1)(fdδ¯(δˆ
∗
d) + nfx(Hˆ(δˆ
∗
x)− ψ(δˆ
∗
d))δˆ
∗
x))]. (I.20)
A detailed derivation of (I.20) is provided in the Appendix.
19Contingent on revealed information, perceived types constitute best approximations of true
types.
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Consumption
We determine the equilibrium wage rate w from P = 1 and obtain aggregate per
period consumption:
C = Lw/P = Lw = Lρ(M + nHˆ(δˆ∗x)Mτ
1−σ)1/(σ−1). (I.21)
Again, a detailed derivation of (I.21) is provided in the Appendix. Apart from
consumption, the final product is spent for start-up investments, market entry of new
firms and for foreign market entry of incumbents that turn exporters by Bayesian
updating. Let (δˆ∗x)−t denote the start-up perceived type that coincides with δˆ
∗
x
after t periods of updating, then (conditional on survival) all firms with start-up
perceived types δˆ0 ∈ ((δˆ
∗
x)−(t−1), (δˆ
∗
x)−t] will turn exporters in their t
th period. As the
entry density of a perceived type δˆ0 equals Meg(δˆ0) and the probability that firms
of this perceived type survive for t periods is given by Eb
δˆ0
((1 − δ)t), the measure
of firms of age t that turn exporters by Bayesian updating every period equals∫ (δˆ∗x)−t
(δˆ∗x)−(t−1)
Eb
δˆ0
((1− δ)t)Meg(δˆ0)dδˆ0. Adding all possible ages t = 1, 2, . . . , T (δˆ
∗
x) <∞
we obtain:20
I = (K + fdG(δˆ
∗
d) + nfxG(δˆ
∗
x))Me
+nfxΣ
T (δˆ∗x)
t=1
∫ (δˆ∗x)−t
(δˆ∗x)−(t−1)
Eb
δˆ0
((1− δ)t)Meg(δˆ0)dδˆ0. (I.22)
Similar to the known type case, trade liberalization forces firms with low net profits
out of the market shifting production towards firms with higher net profits. But as
loan rates (that depend on perceived types) and real per period fixed costs (that
depend on real types) differ systematically, this shift does not always improve aver-
age efficiency of the economy. As we prove in the Appendix the welfare result from
Proposition 4 does not carry over to uncertain firm types.
Proposition 8 (Trade Liberalization and Welfare). In case of uncertain firm types,
trade liberalization can have a negative welfare effect.
The intuition for this result lies in the fact that belief-updating leads to excessive
exporting, as explained above. Lower variable trade costs can exacerbate this inef-
ficiency, which can lead to welfare losses from trade liberalization.
20T (δˆ∗x) denotes the number of periods of Bayesian updating a firm with highest possible start-
up perceived exit probability δˆ∗d needs to turn exporter. As limt→∞ δˆt = 0 for all δˆ, T (δˆ
∗
x) has to
be finite.
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Crisis of Confidence
For many observers, the world-wide recession of 2008/09 has been particularly severe
because it involved a massive reversal of beliefs on the stability of the financial
system (Bacchetta et al., 2010). The relationship between output drop, falling
demand, and the banking crisis epitomized by the collapse of the investment bank
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, is still a matter of academic debate. Our
model is, of course, much too stylized to give a quantitative assessment of the crisis.
However, it allows to shed light on the different effects of a belief revision on small
as compared to large firms. It captures, admittedly in a a very stylized way, the
facts that exports dropped much more than GDP in most countries and in the world
(see Behrens et al. (2010) for a discussion) and that large firms saw their financing
conditions deteriorate more strongly than small ones. This second fact has been
documented using firm-level data for Germany by Rottmann and Wolmersha¨user
(2010), Costa et al. (2011) for Italy, and Kremp and Sevestre (2011) for France.21
Costa also shows that exporting firms have been more severely affected than non-
exporters.
Belief Revision
We consider a shock that triggers all agents to return to former beliefs, i.e. some
firm survival information is deleted.22 There are several natural ways to model a
belief revision. A belief revision could prompt all agents to return to their beliefs a
certain number of periods ago, it could prompt all agents to delete a certain fraction
of firm survival histories, or in the extreme case prompt all agents to return to start-
up perceived types of firms. These scenarios have in common that agents become
suddenly less optimistic as to the survival of firms. As start-up beliefs constitute
lower bounds for belief revisions, the shock does not force any firms to exit domestic
markets. However, some firms stop exporting.
Proposition 9 (Crisis of Confidence). A belief revision forces some firms to exit
foreign markets while leaving the number of domestic firms unaltered.
21This finding relates to the change in the costs of funding; large firms still obtain credit at
lower cost than small ones.
22Entry or exit information is excluded from the revision, as neither defaulted firms can be
reanimated, nor new born firms can be eliminated by a change in belief.
22
I. A Simple Theory of Trade, Finance, and Firm Dynamics
This describes the immediate impact of a crisis in confidence. We compare firm
sorting one period before and after the belief revision. Induced aggregate dynamics,
or transition paths back to steady state are omitted.
Asymmetric Countries
By incorporating country heterogeneity with respect to fixed market entry costs,
we generate multi-level growth into exporting. The older a firm the more export
destinations it will serve. To avoid technical complications, we consider a continuum
of countries ι ∈ [0, 1], each being of zero measure.23 A foreign firm faces fixed costs fι
upon market entry in country ι. Countries are ordered according to the size of their
entry costs, i.e. ι < κ yields fι < fκ. To circumvent the special case of all firms only
serving the market of country ι = 0, which arises due to our simplifying assumption
of free tradability of final goods, we introduce an additional stage of production.
The final goods produced by countries shall henceforth be referred to as country
good. Those country goods are then used to produce the “new” final good without
requiring other inputs according to the standard CES-production function. Both,
country goods and final goods, are traded freely. This setup extension nests all
previous results, as all countries produce identical amounts of country goods in the
symmetric country case. Under this additional stage of production the (normalized)
price index of the final good is given by:
1 = P =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−σι dι
)1/(1−σ)
, (I.23)
with
Pι =
(∫ 1
0
(∫
ωκ,ι∈Ωκ,ι
p(ωκ,ι)
1−σdωκ,ι
)
dκ
)1/(1−σ)
, (I.24)
denoting the price index of country ι, where Ωκ,ι denotes the set of intermediate
goods imported from country κ. All payments, such as wage payments, loan rates
or fixed costs, are still measured in units of final good. Whenever results are inde-
pendent of country type, we suppress the country indicating subscript.
Uniform Wage Rate
Since individual countries are of zero measure, costs or profits a firm faces within
one country are infinitesimal and hence negligible. Only costs or profits a firm faces
23The simplifying assumption of measure-zero countries does not alter the qualitative outcome.
The key finding is that firms gradually expand their export markets. All we need for this result
to hold is that higher exporting fix costs result in higher efficiencies of cut-off exporters. This link
remains valid under quite general conditions.
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within a positive measure of countries will influence its actions. Thus, all firms
that conduct the start-up investment will enter domestic markets, as this entrance
at infinitesimal entry costs entails a positive probability of entry into a positive
measure of foreign countries, yielding positive expected profits. Hence, true and
perceived types of entrants are distributed with probability density function g in all
countries. Besides domestic entry fees, also domestic profits are infinitesimal and
hence negligible. Thus, firm actions (the choice of export destinations and export
prices) solely depend on perceived firm type and are independent of firm location.
As neither the distribution, nor the action of firms depend on their location, the
aggregate production of intermediate inputs by firms located in one country, is
identical for all countries. Thus, by trade balance, all countries are compensated
with identical amounts of the final good yielding identical wages in all countries.
Zero Cut-Off Profit Conditions
Firms enter a foreign market ι as soon as per period profit πι dominates per period
costs δˆtfι, yielding the first zero cut-off profit condition πι = δˆ
∗
ι fι, with δˆ
∗
ι denoting
the cut-off type for entry into market ι. Dividing per period profits, we get the
second zero cut-off profit condition δˆ∗ι = (fκ/fι)δˆ
∗
κ for all ι, κ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, fι < fκ
yields δˆ∗ι > δˆ
∗
κ, i.e. the higher the market entry costs the smaller the set of perceived
firm types that enter. Let κ(δˆt) denote the “last” country a firm of perceived type
δˆt exports to, i.e. the country with cut-off value δˆ
∗
κ = δˆt. Then, a firm of perceived
type δˆt will export to all countries ι ∈ [0, κ(δˆt)]. The lower the firms’ perceived exit
probability δˆt the greater its measure of export destinations, until, for δˆt ≤ δˆ
∗
ι=1 it
exports to all countries.
Free Entry Condition
Free entry of firms ensures that expected future profits Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1−δ)
t
∫ κ(δˆt)
0
(πκ−
δˆtfκ)dκ)) coincide with costs for the start-up investment K. As we prove in the Ap-
pendix, zero cutoff and free entry conditions determine cut-off values δˆ∗ι uniquely.
From the ordering of cut-off values (ι < κ⇒ δˆ∗ι > δˆ
∗
κ) and the updating mechanism
(Proposition 5) we find that firms enter more and more markets as they grow in
age.
Proposition 10 (Firm Specific Effects). The measure of export destinations in-
creases in firm age. In a crisis of confidence, firms exit markets with highest fixed
costs first.
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Incumbent Distributions
As firms of all types enter, the true type distribution of incumbents equals
h(δ) = (g(δ)/δ)/(
∫ 1
0
(g(δ)/δ)dδ) and the perceived type distribution equals
hˆ(δˆ) = jˆ(δˆ)/
∫ 1
0
jˆ(δˆ)dδˆ, with jˆ(δˆ) = Σ
T (δˆ)
t=0 Ebδˆ
−t
((1− δ)t)Meg(δˆ−t).
Firm Masses
All firms that conduct the start-up investment enter and firm exit occurs with
respect to the true type distribution. Thus, the steady state correspondence of
firm masses of entrants and incumbents equals Me = Eh(δ)M . Firm export status
depends on perceived firm type. Thus, the mass of firms within a certain country
that export to country κ equals Mκ = Hˆ(δˆ
∗
κ)M . Additionally, taking into account
the labor market clearing condition, L =
∫ 1
0
Mκτqκdκ, we obtain:
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M = wL/[(σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
Hˆ(δˆ∗κ)δˆ
∗
κfκdκ]. (I.25)
Consumption
Determining the equilibrium wage rate w from P = 1, we receive aggregate per
period consumption:25
C = Lw/P = Lw = L(ρ/τ)
(
M
∫ 1
0
Hˆ(δˆ∗ι )dι
)1/(σ−1)
. (I.26)
In line with the symmetric country case, aggregate per period investment consists
of the units of final product needed for start-up investment, KMe, the units needed
for direct market entry,
∫ 1
0
G(δˆ∗ι )fιdιMe, and the units needed for entry into market
ι by Bayesian updating, fιΣ
T (δˆ∗ι )
t=1
∫ (δˆ∗ι )−t
(δˆ∗ι )−(t−1)
Eb
δˆ0
((1−δ)t)Meg(δˆ0)dδˆ0. As the last term
arises for all markets, we get:
I = KMe +
∫ 1
0
G(δˆ∗ι )fιdιMe
+
∫ 1
0
(
fιΣ
T (δˆ∗ι )
t=1
∫ (δˆ∗ι )−t
(δˆ∗ι )−(t−1)
Eb
δˆ0
((1− δ)t)Meg(δˆ0)dδˆ0
)
dι, (I.27)
which completes the characterization of the general equilibrium under type uncer-
tainty in an asymmetric country setting.
24Details of the derivation are in the Appendix.
25Again, see the Appendix for detailed derivations.
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I.5 Conclusion
Newly created firms are uncertain as to the viability of their new product. Market
expectations about the lifetime of an innovation determine the effective costs of
finance for firms. So, if some fraction of firms’ investment needs are irreversible,
firms differing with respect to the perceived probability of death shocks face different
financing possibilities. International trade interacts with this heterogeneity: firms
with lower perceived default probabilities are more likely to be exporters, lower
trade costs make the expected survival rates of domestic firms smaller but those of
exporters larger; firm survival is longer in open compared to closed economies. All
this facts are well supported by empirical evidence.
In contrast to firm-level heterogeneity in productivity or product quality, a firm’s
life expectancy cannot be easily inferred from its production process or its sales
statistics. Rather, it is more likely that market participants only receive a noisy
signal about the true type of a firm. Conditional on survival of the firm, market
participants update their beliefs. This process has important further implications for
firm behavior and aggregate outcomes. First, it implies that the financial conditions
faced by firms improve over time. Second, due to this, firms will be gradually
growing as they enter more and more markets. Third, the updating process leads to
an excessive expansion of large incumbents to the expense of start-ups, so that the
number of existing firms tends to be too small. Fourth, a sudden reversal of beliefs
leads to reduction in economic activity, but the collapse of trade flows is larger than
that of total income. Again, these facts square well with empirical facts.
The main advantage of the framework is its simplicity and generality. As long as
firms are homogeneous with respect to variable components of revenue, aggregation
is very simple. This allows an analytical characterization of firm dynamics without
making assumptions on the form of distribution functions. It also makes further
extensions of the model possible. One interesting avenue for further research would
be to add a more complete description of financial frictions to the model or to allow
for a second source of heterogeneity, possibly of the form used in Melitz (2003).
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Chapter II
Labor Market Dynamics and
Trade
II.1 Introduction
Recently, the attention directed towards trade and inequality is increasing strongly.
Models with heterogeneous firms and frictional labor markets do a good job in ex-
plaining substantial empirical wage dispersions within narrowly defined skill classes,
occupations, or industries. In most countries these within-group differences account
for more than two thirds of the overall increase in wage inequality.1
Also, the analysis of transition dynamics is recently shifting into the focus of trade
economists. Many questions can not be tackled by simply comparing pre- and post-
shock steady states. Sometimes this approach even results in incorrect conclusions.
Especially labor market frictions can generate grave distortions. E.g. Davidson and
Matusz (2006) show that steady state benefits from an expansion of the high-wage-
sector can be outbalanced by short-run costs. Kaas and Kircher (2013) show that
a positive productivity shock pushes up unemployment initially.
This chapter combines both approaches. I explore the dynamic response of a small
open economy with heterogeneous firms and labor market frictions on trade and
technology shocks. I study individual and aggregate firm dynamics, transitional
wage rates, wage inequality, unemployment, and welfare.
1See Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) for the US, Fuchs, Kruger and Sommer (2010), or
Card, Heining and Kline (2013) for Germany, Blundell and Etheridge (2010) for the UK, Japelli
and Pistaferri (2010) for Italy, Li and Xing (2012) for China, or Helpman, Itskhoki, Mu¨ndler and
Redding (2014) for Brazil.
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By incorporating direct labor market search into a simple small open economy,
I am able to untangle firm decisions from the aggregate firm distribution. This
independence constitutes the heart of this model. It provides tractability not only
in steady state but also in the presence of aggregate shocks. It makes it feasible
to derive all conclusions on individual firm dynamics analytically and to compute
aggregate dynamics without the need to resort to approximation techniques, such
as those of Krussel and Smith (1998), that have been applied in the heterogeneous-
firm search model of Elsby and Michaels (2010) and Fujita and Nakajima (2009) to
analyze aggregate labor market dynamics.
The small open economy setting untangles firm revenues from the aggregate firm
distribution. Direct labor market search untangles firm costs.
The small open economy is similar to the Melitz (2003) framework. The key dif-
ference is that firms apply a concave production function to manufacture a homo-
geneous good. This good can either be sold domestically (at low fix costs) or it is
exported and sold at a high world market price (and higher fix costs). Typical firm
sorting follows: Least productive firms turn inactive, medium productive firms serve
the domestic market, and firms with high productivities export. However, there is
one crucial deviation: As prices and fix costs are exogenous, firm revenue does not
depend on the aggregate firm distribution.
I integrate Kaas and Kircher’s (2013) theory of direct labor market search. Firms
compete for workers by publicly posting long-term contracts. Higher wages attract
more applicants. This increases the job-filling rate for the firm, and decreases the
probability of getting the job for the applicant. Job seekers observe all offers (de-
termine expected wages and probabilities of getting the job) and adjust their search
accordingly. Hence, expected payoffs of all vacancies coincide. This unique expected
payoff constitutes the focal point for all general equilibrium feedback effects. It is
the only general equilibrium object entering the firm’s maximization problem. If
it increases, firm costs increase. If it decreases, firm costs decrease. If it increases,
values of start-ups increase. If it decreases, values of start-ups decrease. Hence, this
unique expected payoff is pinned down by the free entry condition, and, consequently
does not depend on the aggregate firm distribution.2
Neither firm revenue, nor firm costs depend on the aggregate firm distribution. They
solely depend on firm productivity, firm size, and exogenous parameters. Hence, firm
2Here, I assume positive firm entry in every period. This is clearly fulfilled in any steady
state with positive firm mass and positive firm default. However, it limits the size of shocks this
framework can replicate without further adjustments.
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policy functions behave like jump variables. Firms respond to aggregate shocks by
immediately switching to new rules of optimal behavior and then keeping those new
rules constant without slowly readjusting them as the system converges towards its
new steady state. Results on firm dynamics are equally valid in and outside steady
state. I confirm the findings of Felbermayr, Impulliti, and Prat (2014). However,
while their more sophisticated model requires numerical methods to solve the gen-
eral case, I derive all findings analytically. Convex vacancy costs make firms expand
gradually. Conditional on age (or size), more productive firms exhibit higher growth
rates. Conditional on productivity, younger (or smaller) firms exhibit higher growth
rates. Firms realize higher growth rates by both, posting more vacancies and filling
each vacancy with a higher probability. This stylized fact has recently been uncov-
ered in US data by Davis, Fabermann, and Haltiwanger (2013). Higher job-filling
rates are realized by higher wage offers, creating wage dispersion across and within
firms. Random search postulates identical job-filling rates for all firms and vacan-
cies. Moreover, directed search conforms mounting evidence that workers indeed
direct their search and firms commit to wage contracts (e.g. Hall and Krueger,
2012). It avoids the counterfactual prediction of random search with individual
bargaining that wages of existing employees fall when firms approach their optimal
size. Furthermore, gradual firm growth provides a natural rationalization for the
empirical regularity that productivity distributions of exporters and non-exporters
overlap substantially.
I calibrate this model to typical figures of an open economy and explore its qualita-
tive response to aggregate shocks. There are four predominant types (and durations)
of aggregate adjustments along the transition path: Wage adjustments (immediate),
firm adjustments (approx. 1.5 years), wage distribution adjustments (approx. 10
years), and firm distribution adjustments (approx. 100 years). If the system is hit
by a shock, labor market tightness and new wages adjust immediately. Firm policy
functions also respond immediately and prompt incumbents to gradually readjust
their size and mode of activity. New wages adjust at once, however, old contracts
predominate new contracts initially. As pre-shock matches dissolve, old contracts
are gradually replaced by new ones, and wage distribution adjustments slowly con-
verge. Firm distribution adjustments exhibit the lowest speed of convergence. There
might be firms that would not enter the post-shock environment, but still find it
optimal to stay active. There might be firms that would not grow to a certain size in
the post-shock environment, but still find it optimal not to shrink below it. Those
outliers are slowly eradicated by firm default.
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Wage offers jump to a higher level after a positive technology shock. Average wages
increase gradually while old contracts are successively replaced by new ones, and
the temporary coexistence of both contract types results in a high transitory wage
diffusion. The same mechanism occurs after a trade liberalization. However, here
positive firm entry is violated for nine periods following the shock and I apply a
modified approach to compute this passage.3 Zero firm entry means that start-ups
fail to compete for workers at the labor market. Hence, this violation is tanta-
mount to overshooting wages. Computing the dynamic response of welfare and
unemployment, the model exhibits an interesting interaction of technology shocks
and openness. Adjustments in more open economies differ substantially from ad-
justments in less open economies. Welfare rises after a positive technology shock
in less open economies and shrinks in more open economies. And while there are
significant unemployment adjustments after the immediate response in more open
economies, those adjustments are negligible in less open ones. These phenomena are
driven by differing firm adjustments and firm distribution adjustments. A positive
technology shock affects firm output via two channels. First, it increases firm output
by increasing output per worker. Second, it decreases firm output by decreasing the
average number of workers per firm (via increased competition on the labor mar-
ket). Firm output is directly linked to exporting as only firms above a certain output
level find it profitable to serve the world market. In less open economies, channel
one predominates and the share of exporting firms rises. In more open economies,
channel two predominates and the share of exporting firms drops. Exporting is
positively connected to welfare: Consider two economies that produce an identical
aggregate amount of goods. The first consists of many small firms that are not able
to overcome the critical output level for exporting. The second economy consists of
a few large firms that export. Then, neglecting fix costs, the welfare of country one
equals roughly its aggregate output multiplied by the domestic price, the welfare
of country two equals roughly its aggregate output multiplied by the world market
price. Accordingly, the rising share of exporting firms in less open economies boosts
welfare, and the falling share in more open economies reduces welfare. Exporting
is also positively connected to unemployment: Workers are either employees or job
seekers. Hence, the unemployment rate coincides with the sum of all workers that
are queuing for jobs. Exporters pay higher wages, create longer lines of applicants,
and push up unemployment. This counteracts the otherwise negative unemploy-
3The complete transition path consists of over 2000 periods. Computing the modified approach
for 9 periods increases the run-time of the simulation from approximately 10 minutes to 4 hours.
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ment response after a positive technology shock (via increased competition) in less
open economies. Both forces oppose and almost neutralize each other. In more
open economies the negative unemployment effect after a positive technology shock
is amplified by the decreasing share of exporting firms. Here, both forces push in
the same direction.
This model contributes to a large literature on trade, wage inequality and unem-
ployment. One branch explores the relationship between trade and wage inequality
in models with neoclassical labor markets (e.g. Burstein and Vogel (2009), Bustos
(2009), or Yeaple (2005)). These models provide rationales for wage diffusion across
different skill classes. However, they are silent about within-group inequality. An-
other branch introduces labor market frictions and assumes fair or efficiency wages
(e.g. Amiti and Davis (2012), Davis and Harrigan (2007), or Egger and Kreicke-
meier (2009a,b)). These models capture within-group inequality. However, they fail
to provide micro foundations for their assumptions. Yet another branch considers
search and matching as natural explanation for labor market frictions. Most models
consider random search (e.g. Cosar, Guner and Tybout (2011), Felbermayr, Prat
and Schmerer (2011), or Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010)). My model is most
closely related to Felbermayr, Impulliti and Prat (2014), who introduce direct search
in a Melitz (2003) environment. I depart from their setting by incorporating direct
search into a small open economy framework. By doing so, I am able to untangle
firm decisions from the aggregate firm distribution. This independence simplifies the
model substantially. It makes it feasible to study firm dynamics analytically and
to explore aggregate dynamics after a trade liberalization or a positive technology
shock.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section II.2 introduces the
model. Section II.3 derives the general competitive search equilibrium. Section II.4
introduces a simplified search equilibrium and proves equivalence of both equilib-
rium concepts. Then, this simplified search equilibrium is applied to explore firm
dynamics in section II.5, and aggregate dynamics in section II.6. Section II.7 con-
cludes.
II.2 Setup
I consider an infinitely repeated game of symmetric information. All transactions
(costs, revenues, profits,. . . ) are measured in units of the final good. There is an
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endogenous mass of heterogeneous firms. Each firm employs a continuum of workers.
Workers are homogeneous and their total mass is normalized to one. Both, firms
and workers, discount future income with factor β < 1.
Goods Market
Upon entry, firms pay a set-up cost K > 0 and draw their productivity z ∈ Z from
a pdf g(z). A firm with productivity z that employs ℓ workers produces q = zA(ℓ)
units of a homogeneous good that can be sold domestically at the normalized price
1 or on the world market at price p. A(ℓ) denotes a strictly increasing and concave
function. Selling domestically yields per period fixed costs fd > 0. Selling on the
world market yields both, per period fixed costs fx > fd and standard iceberg type
variable trade costs τ > 1. Accordingly, I define firm (net) revenue via:
rd(z, ℓ) = zA(ℓ)− fd (II.1)
in case the firm serves the domestic market, and
rx(z, ℓ) = pzA(ℓ)/τ − fx (II.2)
in case it exports.4 I assume p > τ . If p ≤ τ there is no trade and the small open
economy turns into an autarchy.
Labor Market
Firms die with exogenous per period probability δ > 0. In case of firm default
all workers are laid off into unemployment. Furthermore each existing firm-worker
match separates with exogenous per period probability η > 0. Searching for new
workers is costly. A firm that posts V vacancies incurs recruitment costs C(V ).
Recruitment costs are strictly increasing and strictly convex. Recruiting firms offer
contracts which specify a wage and separation path for all future periods t ≥ tˆ:
Btˆ = (wtˆ,t, ηtˆ,t)t≥tˆ,
with ηtˆ,t ≥ η for all t ≥ tˆ. Unemployed workers search in the sub market (B, λ)
promising the highest expected lifetime income, where a sub market is indexed
by contract B and unemployment-vacancy ratio λ. A vacancy is matched with a
worker with probability m(λ) and a worker finds a job with probability m(λ)/λ.
The matching function m(λ) is differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave
4Including fix costs fd and fx in firm revenue simplifies the notation in the following.
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and satisfies m(0) = 0 and m(λ) ≤ min(1, λ) for all λ ∈ [0,∞). As every firm
hires a continuum of workers, firms know with certainty that posting V vacancies
in sub market (B, λ) yields m(λ)V new hires. There is no search on the job. Each
worker is infinitely-lived, risk-neutral, and receives per period income b ≥ 0 when
unemployed.
Timing
Each period consists of four stages. s = 1: Inactive firms conduct the start-up
investment K and draw their productivity z. Firms decide about market entry.
s = 2: Firms default with exogenous probability δ > 0 or turn inactive endogenously.
Firm-worker match separations take place. s = 3: Firms hire new workers. s = 4:
Firms produce and conduct payments.
II.3 Competitive Search Equilibrium
Optimal Job Search
Let ut(0) denote the utility of an unemployed worker in period t, and let ut(B) denote
the utility of an employed worker under contract B. Every period t unemployed
workers observe all offered contracts Bt and know that the probability to sign a
contract Bt offered in sub market (λ,Bt) equalsm(λ)/λ. Hence, the expected benefit
of searching in sub market (λ,Bt) is given by:
m(λ)
λ
{
ut(Bt)− b− βut+1(0)
}
(II.3)
Suppose this value differs between two sub markets, then job seekers will immedi-
ately redirect their search to the sub market offering the higher expected benefit
and by doing so drive up its worker job ratio λ, and simultaneously drive down the
ratio of the other market. Hence, the expected benefit of job search has to coincide
across all sub markets with λ > 0. Let ρt denote this unique expected benefit. Then
(II.3) pins down the utility ut(Bt) firms have to offer in order to attract a worker
queue of length λ:
ut(Bt) = b+ βut+1(0) +
λ
m(λ)
ρt. (II.4)
The utility of unemployed worker solves the Bellman equation ut(0) = b + ρt +
βut+1(0), i.e. ut(0) = (b+ ρt)/(1− β) in steady state. The size of ρt is pinned down
by the free entry condition as discussed below.
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Optimal Firm Growth
Let ℓtˆ,tˆ and Btˆ = (wtˆ,t, ηtˆ,t)t≥tˆ denote those employees of a firm that were hired
in period tˆ and their contracts respectively. Then, in period t, this firm employs
ℓtˆ,t =
∏t
t′=tˆ(1− ηtˆ,t′)ℓtˆ,tˆ workers that were hired in period tˆ. Suppose the firm is of
age a. Then its accumulated employment stock from previous periods is given by
ℓt−1 =
∑t−1
tˆ=t−a ℓtˆ,t. This denotes its employment stock after separations have taken
place (stage s = 2) and before hiring is conducted (stage s = 3). Firms solve the
following maximization problem. In period t a firm takes as given its productivity z,
its employment stock ℓt−1 and the contracts signed with these workers (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
. It
chooses whether to stay active (in case it is not hit by an exogenous default shock)
or to exit the market endogenously. In case it stays active, it chooses whether to
serve the domestic market ι = d or to export ι = x and decides about the optimal
number of vacancies V and the optimal contract Bt:
Jt
(
z, ℓt−1, (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι
(
z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t
)
− C(V )−W
+βJt+1
(
z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a
)}
, (II.5)
s.t. ℓt,t = m(λ)V, ℓt =
t∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t+1, ℓtˆ,t+1 =
t+1∏
t′=tˆ
(1− ηtˆ,t′)ℓtˆ,tˆ, (II.6)
W =
t∑
tˆ=t−a
wtˆ,tℓtˆ,t, ut(Bt) = b+ βut+1(0) +
λ
m(λ)
ρt. (II.7)
Separation rates ηtˆ,t′ and wages wtˆ,t are specified in contract Btˆ = (wtˆ,t, ηtˆ,t)t≥tˆ and
the second equation of (II.7) is enforced by optimal job search of unemployed workers
(see (II.4)). It is no restriction to assume that the firm offers only one type of con-
tract and searches in only one sub market. Obviously, only firms (z, ℓt−1, (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
)
with positive value Jt(z, ℓt−1, (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
) ≥ 0 will stay active, yielding a continuum
of cut-off values zd(ℓt−1, (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
) implicitly defined via:
Jt
(
zd, ℓt−1, (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
)
= 0. (II.8)
Firms with productivity z below zd will exit the market endogenously. Firms with
productivity z above zd will grow according to (II.5)-(II.7).
Remark 1. Two firms with same age a and productivity z face the identical control
problem (II.5) - (II.8) every period. Hence, this framework does not differentiate
between them and firm type (z, ℓt−1, (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
) can likewise be expressed as (z, a).
34
II. Labor Market Dynamics and Trade
I will make us of this more concise firm type in the following.
Optimal Firm Entry
I close the model by formulating two additional identities. First, I pin down the size
of ρt via the free entry condition for firms. Second, I derive the mass of entrants
Nt from the resource constraint implied by the restriction of total labor force to the
measure of one.
Assuming positive firm entry, the free entry condition is binding:∫
z
Jt(z, a = 0) dg(z) = K. (II.9)
For start-ups (a = 0), it holds ℓt−1 = 0 and (Btˆ)
t−1
tˆ=t−a
= ∅. The left hand side of
(II.9) strictly decreases in ρt, the right hand side is constant in ρt. This yields a
unique solution. The negative dependency of the left hand side on ρt can directly
be inferred from (II.7). Raising ρt drives up the utility ut(Bt) firms have to offer to
job seekers. Higher utility corresponds to higher expected wages and thus affects
firm value negatively.
The resource feasibility implies that job seekers and employed workers add up to a
measure of one. Equivalently, all workers holding contracts from previous periods
and those queuing for a job (ignoring whether their application is successful or not)
add up to one. LetMt(z, a) denote the measure of firms with productivity z and age
a in period t, ℓt−1(z, a) each firm’s accumulated employment stock from previous
periods (see (II.6)) and Vt(z, a), respectively λt(z, a) its optimal number of vacancies
respectively worker-job ratio. Then, firmsMt(z, a) employ ℓt−1(z, a)Mt(z, a) workers
hired in previous periods and additionally attract λt(z, a)Vt(z, a)Mt(z, a) workers
that are queuing for a job. Summing up all firm ages and productivities the resource
constraint reads:∑
a≥0
∫
z
{
ℓt−1(z, a) + λt(z, a)Vt(z, a)
}
Mt(z, a)dg(z) = 1 (II.10)
Firm masses evolve according to:
Mt(z, a) = 0, if z < zd(a), (II.11)
Mt(z, a) = (1− δ)Ntg(z), if a = 0 and z ≥ zd(a), (II.12)
Mt(z, a) = (1− δ)Mt−1(z, a− 1), if a ≥ 1 and z ≥ zd(a). (II.13)
The parameter zd(a) denotes the domestic cut-off value defined in (II.8) and Nt
denotes the measure of firms that conduct the start-up investment in period t. Thus,
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all firm masses Mt(z, a ≥ 1) in (II.10) are determined by firm masses of previous
periods and only Mt(z, a = 0) = (1− δ)Ntg(z) can adjust according to the resource
constraint. This pins down the size of Nt.
General Equilibrium
The following equilibrium concept is equally valid in- and outside steady state. So
it allows us to explore labor market dynamics after aggregate shocks.
Definition 2. Given an initial firm distribution M−1(z, a), a competitive search
equilibrium is a list: {
ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a), Bt(z, a), ρt, Mt(z, a)
}
that satisfies:
1. Optimal firm decisions: ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a) and Bt(z, a) solve (II.5)-(II.8).
2. Free entry: ρt evolves according to (II.9).
3. Labor market resource constraint: Mt(z, a) solves (II.10)-(II.13).
for every firm type (z, a) and every period t ≥ 0.
This constitutes the general foundation of this model. Next, I prove that I can
switch from this general foundation to a very simple and specific representation.
II.4 Simplified Search Equilibrium
I alter the competitive search approach by letting firms maximize a modified surplus
(specified in (II.14)). As it turns out, this yields a very parsimonious equilibrium
concept independent of job contracts and wage payments. I prove that this simplified
search equilibrium is equivalent to the competitive search equilibrium and explore
its structure.
Firm Surplus
Consider a firm with productivity z and an accumulated employment stock ℓt−1.
Then, I define its modified surplus via:
St(z, ℓt−1) = max
ι,V,λ,ηt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− b(ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)
−µt(ℓt−1 + λV )− C(V ) + βSt+1(z, ℓt)
}
, (II.14)
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s.t. ℓt,t = m(λ)V, ℓt = (1− ηt)(ℓt−1 + ℓt,t) and ηt ≥ η, (II.15)
if it is non-negative. If this expression is negative the firm turns inactive and its
surplus equals zero. Firm surplus (II.14) can be considered as the firm’s social
value. It encompasses firm revenue net of opportunity cost of labor, and net of
vacancy posting costs for all future periods. Opportunity cost of labor consists of
two components. First, the opportunity cost of working at the firm b(ℓt−1 + ℓt,t).
Second, the opportunity cost of being allocated to the firm µt(ℓt−1 + λV ). While
the first term is restricted to employed workers ℓt−1 + ℓt,t, the second is evaluated
at ℓt−1 + λV . It additionally captures unemployed workers who are queuing for a
job at the firm (and hence, are not able to search for another job). As the firm does
not differentiate between different cohorts of employees, there is no reason to stick
to the cohort specific separation rates from the competitive search setting. Hence,
the firm chooses a uniform separation probability ηt for all its employees.
Again there is a one to one correspondence of firm type (z, ℓt−1) and firm type (z, a),
with a ≥ 0 denoting firm age (see Remark 1). I will use both characterizations
interchangeably, depending on which fits the specific discussion better.
Optimal Job Search
Unemployed workers direct their search towards jobs which generate the highest
additional surplus in expectation (taking into account the probability of getting
the job m(λ)/λ). As each firm employs a continuum of workers this additional
surplus is the marginal surplus of the firm with respect to its labor force. Suppose
its value differs between two vacancies, then job seekers will immediately redirect
their search activities towards the vacancy that offers the higher expected marginal
surplus and by doing so drive up the corresponding worker job ratio. This decreases
the vacancies’ expected marginal surplus. Hence, its value has to coincide across all
recruiting firms. The opportunity cost of being allocated to a certain firm is the cost
of not being able to apply for other vacancies. The value of being able to apply for
another vacancy is identical to the vacancies’ expected marginal surplus. Thus, the
opportunity cost µt and this unique expected marginal surplus coincide. Capturing
the value of being able to search for a job, µt constitutes the dual object to the
expected benefit ρt discussed in section II.3. As it turns out (proof of Proposition
11) their values indeed coincide in equilibrium. Accordingly, the value of µt in
equilibrium is pinned down by the dual free entry condition:∫
z
St(z, a = 0)dg(z) = K. (II.16)
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The left hand side decreases in µt, the right hand side is constant in µt. This yields
a unique solution.
General Equilibrium
Again imposing resource feasibility (II.10) and firm distribution evolution (II.11)-
(II.13), the modified equilibrium concept reads:
Definition 3. Given an initial firm distribution M−1(z, a), a simplified search equi-
librium is a list: {
ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a), λt(z, a), ηt(z, a), µt, Mt(z, a)
}
that satisfies:
1. Optimal firm decisions: ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a), λt(z, a) and ηt(z, a) solve (II.14)-
(II.15).
2. Free entry: ρt evolves according to (II.16).
3. Labor market resource constraint: Mt(z, a) solves (II.10)-(II.13).
for every firm type (z, a) and every period t ≥ 0.
Following proposition asserts the equivalence of the competitive search equilibrium
concept and the simplified search equilibrium concept. There may be different
competitive search equilibria (with different contract structures Bt(z, a)) giving rise
to the same simplified search equilibrium. However, as firm dynamics and aggregate
dynamics are pinned down by the simplified equilibrium those different competitive
search equilibria belong to the same equivalence class concerning their outcomes
within this framework.
Proposition 11. Let {ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a), Bt(z, a), ρt, Mt(z, a)} constitute a compet-
itive search equilibrium allocation. Then this allocation also constitutes a simpli-
fied equilibrium {ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a), λt(z, a), ηt(z, a), µt, Mt(z, a)} with µt = ρt and
λt(z, a) and ηt(z, a) pinned down by contracts Bt(z, a). Likewise, every simplified
equilibrium can be expressed as competitive search equilibrium with contracts Bt(z, a)
chosen in line with λt(z, a) and ηt(z, a).
Proof: Appendix.
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II.5 Firm Dynamics
Allowing vacancies to become negative and imposing zero firing costs C(V ) = 0,
perfect matching for separations m(λ) = 1 and λ = 1 whenever V < 0, then firms
can separate from employees by choosing negative vacancies instead of increasing
the natural separation rate η (see proof of Proposition 12). This restricts the iden-
tification of optimal firm behavior to the three policy functions ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a) and
λt(z, a).
Proposition 12 (Policy Functions). Consider a firm with productivity z and size
ℓ−t = ℓ. If the firm chooses V (z, ℓ) ≥ 0, it holds:
1. λz(z, ℓ) > 0 and λℓ(z, ℓ) < 0,
2. Vz(z, ℓ) > 0 and Vℓ(z, ℓ) < 0,
3. ι(z, ℓ) = x if pzA(ℓ) ≥ (τ − 1)(fx − fd), otherwise ι(z, ℓ) = d.
If the firm chooses 0 > V (z, ℓ) > −ℓ, it holds:
1. λ(z, ℓ) = 1,
2. V (z, ℓ) = (A′)−1((b+ µ)/z)− ℓ < 0,
3. ι(z, ℓ) = x if pzA(ℓ) ≥ (τ − 1)(fx − fd), otherwise ι(z, ℓ) = d.
If the firm chooses V (z, ℓ) = −ℓ, it defaults endogenously and generates zero surplus
S(z, ℓ) = 0.
Proof: Appendix.
This proposition is equally valid in and outside steady state. If the economy is hit
by an aggregate shock, firms immediately switch to new policy functions. Both
regimes of optimal behavior (the policy functions before and after the shock) fulfill
Proposition 12.
Corollary 4. Suppose V (z, ℓ) ≥ 0. Then, conditional on size, more productive
firms post more vacancies and exhibit higher job-filling rates, i.e. Vz(z, ℓ) > 0 and
λz(z, ℓ) > 0. Conditional on productivity, older (and larger) firms post less vacancies
and exhibit lower job-filling rates, i.e. Vℓ(z, ℓ) < 0 and λℓ(z, ℓ) < 0.
39
II. Labor Market Dynamics and Trade
Independence from the Aggregate Firm Distribution
One important restriction is the assumption of positive firm entry in every period.
This is clearly fulfilled in any steady state with positive firm mass and positive firm
default probability. Though, ensuring positive firm entry in every period along the
transition path might limit the size of shocks we are able to analyze without further
adjustments (depending on other model parameters). However, the assumption
untangles firm decisions from the aggregate firm distribution. To gain intuition for
this independence, consider the search problem of an unemployed worker. He can
either direct his job search towards incumbents (firms of age a > 0), or towards
start-ups (firms of age a = 0). Every recruiting firm has to offer the identical
expected marginal surplus µt. Thus, the expected marginal surplus of incumbents
is pinned down by the expected marginal surplus of start-ups. The expected surplus
of start-ups in turn, has to fulfill the free entry condition (II.16). This pins down
the size of µt independently of the aggregate firm distribution.
This is not true if the measure of start-ups equals zero. In this case, recruiting
incumbents only compete with other recruiting incumbents. Hence, the incumbent
offering the lowest expected marginal surplus that is still able to attract a positive
measure of job seekers pins down the size of µt. The firm type of this least efficient
recruiting incumbent depends on the distribution of existing firms.
If there is positive entry, µt solves (II.16) in every period. It constitutes a jump
variable with respect to aggregate shocks. If the size of an exogenous parameter
changes and affects firm surplus, µt responds immediately to keep the free entry
condition satisfied. There is no time leg or slow adjustment process. Hence, also
firm surplus St(z, a) behaves like a jump variable. And consequently the same holds
true for firm policy functions ιt(z, a), Vt(z, a), λt(z, a). This means if an exogenous
shock occurs, firms immediately switch to new rules of optimal behavior, and then
keep those rules constant without slowly readjusting them as the system converges
towards its new steady state.
II.6 Aggregate Dynamics
I consider two scenarios: A trade liberalization modeled via a sudden 1% reduction
of variable trade costs τ , and a positive technology shock modeled via a 5% increase
of the entrant productivity distribution g(z). In neither scenario the shock is antic-
ipated. It hits the system in its initial steady state and after the shock, parameters
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remain constant until the system reaches its new steady state. I explore resulting
transition paths by implementing the simplified search equilibrium (Definition 3) in
Matlab R2012a.
I infer salaries by assuming flat wage contracts. A flat wage contractBtˆ = (wtˆ,t, ηtˆ,t)t≥tˆ
offers constant per period compensation wtˆ,t = w as long as the match persists and
zero compensation wtˆ,t = 0 subsequently. The separation probability is also con-
stant and is chosen as small as possible, i.e. ηtˆ,t = η. These contracts establish a
one to one correspondence of wage rates w and sub markets λ, and provide a simple
means to study the development of inequality along the transition path.
Calibration
I study the implications of this framework by calibrating it to typical figures of an
open economy. The purpose of this numerical simulation is to reveal the qualitative
response of the model, to explore predominant forces, and not to discuss the specific
magnitudes of effects. I choose the functional forms in line with Kaas and Kircher
(2013), i.e. firm production, search costs, and matching function are given by A(ℓ) =
ℓα, with α = 0.7, by C(V ) = cV 2, and by m(λ) = 1/(1 + κ/λ) respectively. Also
according to Kaas and Kircher (2013), I choose the target values for average worker
job ratio E[λ] = 1.4 and for average job finding probability E[m(λ)/λ] = 45%.5
The remaining target values are taken from Felbermayr, Impullitti and Prat (2014).
I calibrate the search cost parameter c, the matching function parameter κ, the
unemployment benefit b and the monthly separation probability s, to match the
target values for the labor market listed in the first panel of table II.1. The third
target value ensures that average wages are approximately three times the size of
the unemployment benefit b. The world market price p, initial set-up costs K, per
period fixed costs of domestic activity fd, and per period fixed costs for exporting
fx are chosen to match the target values of the second panel of table II.1. Firm size
is measured in number of employees.
The model matches the labor market moments almost perfectly. It performs less
accurate on firm distributional moments. This result corresponds to a rich labor
market modeling and very stylized firm product markets in this framework. There
are some more parameters which are not calibrated but pinned down directly. The
discount factor β = 0.9967 matches an annual interest rate of 4%. The monthly
5E[·] denotes the expected value with respect to the firm distribution, i.e. E[λ] =
1
M
∑∞
a=0
∫ zmax
zmin
λ(z, a)M(z, a)dz.
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Labor Market Parameter Model Target Source
Avg. worker job ratio c = 0.02 1.4 1.4 Kaas and Kircher
Avg. job finding rate κ = 0.90 45% 45% Kaas and Kircher
Unempl. benefit rel. to wage b = 0.02 33% 35% Felbermayr et. al
Unemployment rate s = 0.05 8.3% 8.3% Felbermayr et. al
Firms
Share of exporting firms p = 3.75 27% 28% Felbermayr et. al
Avg. firm size K = 900 32 36 Felbermayr et. al
Avg. size domestic firm fd = 1 16 15 Felbermayr et. al
Avg. size exporter fx = 15 75 89 Felbermayr et. al
Table II.1: Calibrated parameters.
firm default probability equals δ = 0.3% from Felbermayr, Impullitti and Prat
(2014). In line with Kaas and Kircher (2013) productivity levels of start-ups are
uniformly distributed across 40 equidistant values between zmin = 0.8 and zmax = 1,
with the minimum productivity level being smaller than the domestic cut-off value
zmin < zd(a = 0) in all transition periods and steady states of both scenarios.
Response Types
There are four predominant types of dynamic responses to either shock.
1. Immediate response: Wage adjustments.
2. Short-term response: Firm adjustments (around 1.5 years).
3. Medium-term response: Wage distribution adjustments (around 10 years).
4. Long-term response: Firm distribution adjustments (around 100 years).
The marginal surplus µt (which can likewise be interpret as labor market tight-
ness) constitutes a jump variable with respect to aggregate shocks. Hence, labor
market tightness switches to its new value at once and then remains unchanged
subsequently. This drives the immediate wage response. Incumbent firms switch
to their new policy functions immediately, and then slowly adjust their size and
mode of activity (inactive, domestic, or exporting) according to those new rules.
Convex vacancy costs prevent them from directly jumping to their optimal new size
and mode of activity. This generates the short-term response. New wages adjust
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immediately, however there are old contracts that substantially shape the aggregate
wage distribution initially. As those old matches dissolve, the wage distribution ad-
justments diminish. The duration of this medium-term response is primarily driven
by the value of the separation probability η and the value of the firm default prob-
ability δ. Firm distribution adjustments exhibit the lowest speed. There might be
old firms of productivity levels that would not enter in the post-shock environment
but still find it optimal to stay active. There might be firms that would not grow to
a certain size in the post-shock environment but still find it optimal not to shrink
below this size. Those outliers are slowly eradicated by firm default with probability
δ, and the aggregate firm distribution converges.
Inequality
There is overshooting of average wages after a trade liberalization, and monotonic
adjustment of average wages after a positive technology shock. In both scenarios
there is overshooting of wage variance during the medium-term response of approx-
imately 120 periods (or 10 years).
Figure II.1: Average wage impulse response
to a permanent 5% increase of firm produc-
tivity.
Figure II.2: Impulse response of wage vari-
ance to a permanent 5% increase of firm pro-
ductivity.
The interpretation of figure II.1 and II.2 is straight forward. The positive technology
shock intensifies firm competition and pushes the labor market tightness to a higher
level. The average wage (of new contracts) adjusts immediately. It switches to
a higher value and remains unchanged subsequently. Hence, the average wage (of
all contracts) monotonically increases as new contracts are signed and old matches
break. This results in an increased transitory wage variance that peaks around the
time when the mass of new and old contracts coincide.
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Figure II.3: Average wage impulse response
to a permanent 1% reduction of variable
trade cost τ .
Figure II.4: Impulse response of wage vari-
ance to a permanent 1% reduction of vari-
able trade cost τ .
The same mechanism underlies figure II.3 and II.4. However, there is one significant
difference. While scenario one (the trade liberalization) increases the efficiency of
incumbents and entrants alike, scenario two (the positive technology shock) only
increases the efficiency of start-ups. In scenario one, a considerable fraction of in-
cumbents responds with accelerated growth. In scenario two, all incumbents respond
with reduced growth rates. It turns out that expanding incumbents in scenario one
absorb the complete mass of workers initially. Positive firm entry is violated for 9
periods. Hence, the value of µ has to be pinned down by the alternative condition
that the mass of absorbed workers coincides with the mass of available workers.
The marginal surplus µ constitutes a variable cost component for workers in firm
value (II.14). The higher µ the lower the mass of absorbed workers, the lower µ
the higher the mass of absorbed workers, yielding an unique solution. However, this
solution is not independent from the aggregate firm distribution. The value of µ
depends on the type of the least efficient firm that is still able to attract a positive
measure of job seekers. The more drastic the worker shortage, the higher this cutoff
firm type. While there is zero firm entry, the aggregate firm mass slowly shrinks,
the worker shortage lessens, the cutoff firm type decreases, and finally it reaches the
level where firm entry turns positive again. Hence, µ jumps to a high level after
the shock, then shrinks monotonically until it hits the threshold of positive firm
entry, and then remains unchanged subsequently. The wage overshooting displayed
in figure II.3 follows.6
6Solving this modified condition for 9 periods increases the run-time of the simulation from
approximately 10 minutes to 4 hours.
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Unemployment
There is no overshooting or undershooting of unemployment in either scenario. The
unemployment rate is positively correlated with openness, and negatively correlated
with productivity levels of entrants. A trade liberalization increases unemployment.
A positive technology shock decreases unemployment. The first finding is not very
surprising.7 The second finding is standard. However, there is an interesting inter-
action of productivity shocks and openness: Unemployment responds stronger in
more open economies. Figure II.5 shows the impulse response of the unemployment
rate to a positive technology shock for different levels of openness, of an approxi-
mately 27% share of exporting firms (for τ = 1.4 and τ = 1.407), a 24% share (for
τ = 1.414) and a 21% share (for τ = 1.421).
Figure II.5: Unemployment impulse re-
sponse to a permanent 5% increase of firm
productivity for τ = 1.4 (solid line), τ =
1.407 (dashed line), τ = 1.414 (dash-dot
line) and τ = 1.421 (dotted line).
Figure II.6: Impulse response of average ap-
plicants per job-offer to a permanent 5% in-
crease of firm productivity for τ = 1.4 (solid
line), τ = 1.407 (dashed line), τ = 1.414
(dash-dot line) and τ = 1.421 (dotted line).
Workers are either employed, or they are applying for a job at a certain firm. Hence,
unemployment is driven by the average number of applicants per job offer (figure
II.6) and their average success in getting the job (figure II.7). A positive technology
shock decreases unemployment by both, decreasing the average number of applicants
per job, and increasing their probability of being successful. All curves exhibit a
similar immediate response to the technology shock with respect to trade openness.
However, their trend after this immediate response differs systematically. While
there is a significant short-, and long-term response for τ = 1.4 and τ = 1.407, it is
very small for τ = 1.414, and almost non-existent for τ = 1.421. The interpretation
of the immediate response is straight forward. The technology shock pushes up µ,
7Helpman, Itskhoky and Redding (2010) show that the impact of trade on unemployment is
ambiguous.
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Figure II.7: Average job finding rate im-
pulse response to a permanent 5% increase
of firm productivity for τ = 1.4 (solid line),
τ = 1.407 (dashed line), τ = 1.414 (dash-dot
line) and τ = 1.421 (dotted line).
Figure II.8: Average firm size impulse re-
sponse to a permanent 5% increase of firm
productivity for τ = 1.4 (solid line), τ =
1.407 (dashed line), τ = 1.414 (dash-dot
line) and τ = 1.421 (dotted line).
this increases the cost of having many applicants. The average number of applicants
decreases, the job finding rate increases and unemployment drops. To understand
the short- and long-term response we have to dig a little deeper. The short- and
long-term response is driven by firm adjustments and firm distribution adjustments.
Firms respond by adjusting their size and mode of activity (inactive, domestic,
or exporting). Figure II.8 shows that for τ = 1.4 and τ = 1.407 firms adjust
by decreasing their size. This yields lower average growth rates and entails lower
average numbers of applicants per job. The negative short- and long-term response
of unemployment follows. This channel is inactive for τ = 1.414 and τ = 1.421.
The positive technology shock increases competition and prompts firm to shrink
independent of τ . However, for τ = 1.414 and τ = 1.421 this firm size adjustment
is neutralized by the firm sorting adjustment. The average size of domestic firms
shrinks from 16.5 to 16.3, and from 16.6 to 16.4 for τ = 1.414 and τ = 1.421
respectively. The average size of exporters shrinks from 74.3 to 73.7, and from 74.1
to 73.5 for τ = 1.414 and τ = 1.421. However, the relative share of exporting firms
increases from 24% to 25%, and from 20.5% to 21.5% for τ = 1.414 and τ = 1.421.
This opposing effect neutralizes otherwise negative short- and long-term changes of
average firm size, and diminish the short- and long-term response of unemployment.
Welfare
Welfare is measured in terms of aggregate output. Welfare is positively correlated
with openness and increases after a trade liberalization. Surprisingly, welfare is
not positively correlated with productivity in general. Figure II.9 shows a negative
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welfare response to a positive technology shock for more open economies (τ = 1.4
and τ = 1.407) and a positive response for less open economies (τ = 1.414 and
τ = 1.421). Figure II.10 shows a similar result for the response of the relative share
of exporting firms. The lines for τ = 1.4 and τ = 1.407 overlap. Their value is very
similar, however not identical. The line for τ = 1.407 lies below the line for τ = 1.4
and tracks it with an approximately constant distance of 0.01.
Figure II.9: Impulse response of aggregate
output to a permanent 5% increase of firm
productivity for τ = 1.4 (solid line), τ =
1.407 (dashed line), τ = 1.414 (dash-dot
line) and τ = 1.421 (dotted line).
Figure II.10: Impulse response of share of
exporters to a permanent 5% increase of firm
productivity for τ = 1.4 and τ = 1.407
(solid line), τ = 1.414 (dash-dot line) and
τ = 1.421 (dotted line).
Once a firm hits a certain output level, selling at the world market and paying
exporting fix costs generates more profit than domestic activity. It becomes an
exporter. This interaction of firm output and exporting constitutes the key driver
of the welfare response in figure II.9. Consider two small open economies producing
an identical aggregate amount of goods. The first economy consists of many small
firms that are not able to overcome the critical output level for exporting. The
second economy consists of few large enterprises that export. Then, neglecting fix
costs, in the second case welfare will be approximately p times higher than in the first
case (with p denoting the world market price). A positive technology shock affects
firm output via two channels. First, it increases firm output via increasing output
per worker. Second, it decreases firm output via decreasing the average number of
workers per firm. This second effect results from intensified firm competition on
the labor market after the positive technology shock. As it turns out, channel one
predominates channel two for less open economies (τ = 1.414 and τ = 1.421). A
positive technology shock increases average firm output, the share of exporters rises
and pushes up welfare. For more open economies (τ = 1.4 and τ = 1.407) the
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impact of channel two prevails. A positive technology shock decreases average firm
output, the share of exporters drops and welfare shrinks.
II.7 Conclusion
By incorporating direct labor market search into a simple small open economy, I
am able to untangle firm decisions from the aggregate firm distribution. This in-
dependence provides tractability not only in steady state but also in the presence
of aggregate shocks. It makes it feasible to derive all conclusions on firm dynamics
analytically and to compute aggregate dynamics without the need to resort to ap-
proximation techniques. Firm policy functions solely depend on firm productivity,
firm size, and exogenous parameters. Hence, firms respond to aggregate shocks by
immediately switching to new rules of optimal behavior and then keeping those new
rules constant without slowly readjusting them as the system converges towards its
new steady state, and results on firm dynamics are equally valid in and outside
steady state. Convex vacancy costs make firms expand gradually and provide a
natural rationalization for the empirical regularity that productivity distributions
of exporters and non-exporters overlap substantially. Conditional on age (or size),
more productive firms exhibit higher growth rates. Conditional on productivity,
younger (or smaller) firms exhibit higher growth rates. Firms realize higher growth
rates by both posting more vacancies and filling each vacancy with a higher prob-
ability. Higher job-filling rates are realized by higher wage offers, creating wage
dispersion across and within firms.
I calibrate the model to typical figures of an open economy and study its dynamic
response to a trade liberalization and a positive technology shock. There are four
predominant types (and durations) of aggregate adjustments along the transition
path: Wage adjustments (immediate), firm adjustments (approx. 1.5 years), wage
distribution adjustments (approx. 10 years), and firm distribution adjustments (ap-
prox. 100 years). While a trade liberalization generates overshooting wage aver-
ages, a positive technology shock entails monotonically increasing averages. Both
scenarios imply significant transitory inequalities. Variances of the aggregate wage
distribution overshoot substantially. While a trade liberalization pushes up unem-
ployment, a positive technology shock decreases the number of jobless workers. The
adjustment speed of unemployment after a positive technology shock is higher in
less open economies. A trade liberalization increases welfare. A positive technology
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shock decreases welfare in more open economies and increases welfare in less open
economies.
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Chapter III
Firm Life Cycles in a Global
Economy
III.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a coherent theory of gradual firm growth and decay in open
economies.
Existing theories on firm dynamics can be divided into two groups: Theories explor-
ing evolution of supply characteristics, and theories exploring evolution of demand
characteristics. The first group is silent about firm specific expansion paths. The
second group does not capture productivity evolution. Furthermore, both groups
restrict on firm growth and neglect shrinkage. In contrast, Sampson (2014) puts for-
ward a theory of firm shrinkage caused by aggregate technological progress. How-
ever, he neglects firm growth. Combining these separate approaches, this model
replicates complete firm life cycles beginning with firm birth, followed by positive
productivity growth and individual firm expansion, fading into stepwise contraction,
and ending with either endogenous or exogenous death.
Typical firm aging patterns are driven by three core mechanisms: First, there is
supply uncertainty leading to gradual improvement of production techniques on
firm level. Second, there is demand uncertainty resulting in firm specific expansion
paths. Third, there are knowledge spillovers which constantly intensify competition
and lead to crowding out of old firms. While firms are young, expanding forces gen-
erated by improving production techniques outweigh contracting forces generated
by increasing competition. Young firms grow and enter new markets. They learn
about countries demand characteristics and adjust their expansion path accordingly.
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As firms grow older, expected productivity improvements decrease and contracting
forces take over. Market exit prevails. They are slowly driven out of all countries
and by leaving their last destination they turn inactive and die.
Supply uncertainty generates firm learning and firm growth: Each firm is assigned an
unobservable productivity distribution upon its birth. This distribution generates a
new productivity sample every period. Whenever a new productivity sample domi-
nates the firm’s current productivity it switches technology and produces according
to this new productivity. This generates productivity growth. As firm productivity
distributions do not change along firm life cycles, expected growth rates are highest
for young firms and converge towards zero as firm age converges towards infinity.
Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity distribution. Hence, they
cannot learn about their distribution by observing competitors. However, they can
learn about their distribution by observing their own productivity sample history.
This learning has no effect on their current productivity, but it makes them more
or less optimistic about their future productivity evolution, and via this channel
market entry/exit decisions are influenced.
Demand uncertainty results in firm specific expansion paths: Each firm is assigned
a per period demand shock probability for every country. Demand is either posi-
tive or - when hit by a shock - completely vanishes. Those market specific default
probabilities do not change along firm life cycles. They are not observable, how-
ever, firms can learn about them by various means. First, market entry triggers a
noisy signal of its associated default probability. Second, firms update their belief
according to their survival histories. If a firm is hit by a demand shock in a certain
country, it gets less optimistic. If it survives, it gets more optimistic. Third, there is
cross-country learning. Demand characteristics of countries are positively correlated
to a varying degree. Hence, a firm belief for a certain market is also affected by
demand signals in other markets. Firm specific entry signals, firm specific survival
histories and cross-country learning entail firm specific beliefs which result in firm
specific expansion paths. However, more productive firms will enter more markets
in expectation. This does not only result in a negative correlation of firm productiv-
ity and endogenous firm death, but also in negative correlation of firm productivity
and exogenous firm death. Endogenous firm death corresponds to a firm that turns
inactive voluntarily. Exogenous firm death corresponds to a firm that is hit by a
demand shock in all its destinations simultaneously.
51
III. Firm Life Cycles in a Global Economy
Technology diffusion constantly intensifies competition: There are knowledge spill-
overs from incumbent firms to entrants. Start-ups observe production techniques of
existing firms and imperfectly apply them to their product. In line with Sampson
(2014) I assume that entrants draw their productivity type from a distribution
that depends on the productivity type distribution of incumbents. This generates
monotonically improving entrant distributions of productivity distributions - their
productivity type - and results in monotonically improving average productivities
of incumbents.
This model contributes to a new and large literature on trade, firm heterogene-
ity, and firm dynamics. One branch features evolution of supply characteristics as
drivers of firm dynamics. It explores firm dynamics that are generated by firm type
evolution. For example, Arkolakis (2011) and Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and Opromolla
(2013) consider dynamics extensions of Melitz (2003), in which firms experience ex-
ogenous random shocks to their productivity. Atkeson and Burstein (2010), and
Burstein and Melitz (2012) model endogenous innovations in firm productivity. In
Costantini and Melitz (2009) firms face both idiosyncratic uncertainty and sunk
costs for both exporting and technology adoption. Liu (2012) considers firms that
can adjust production capacities through capital investment over time. Another
branch focuses on demand characteristics of firms. It explores dynamics that are
generated by the environment of firms. Albornoz et al. (2012) and Akhmetova
(2013) emphasize firm learning about uncertain demand. Eaton et al. (2012) and
Chaney (2011) analyze how matches between buyers and sellers evolve over time
and across markets. While supply uncertainty rationalizes positive productivity
growth, it does not explain firm specific expansion paths. And while demand un-
certainty rationalizes firm specific expansion paths, it is silent about productivity
dynamics. Furthermore, both theories restrict on analyzing drivers for positive firm
growth. Neither rationalizes firm shrinkage. Aging and contraction of firms can be
rationalized by knowledge spillovers a` la Sampson (2014). However, he limits his
approach to a theory of firm shrinkage. Firms start their life cycles at maximum
size and then slowly decay until they vanish. I depart from these existing models
by exploring forces that generate firm supply evolution, firm demand evolution, and
firm contraction within one simple unified framework.
Beside these recently developed theories, there also exists an older branch studying
the interaction of trade and firm dynamics initiated by Vernons (1966) seminal
article on product life cycles (e.g. Krugman (1979), or Grossman and Helpman
(1991)). However, there is no gradual firm growth and shrinkage in these theories
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either. Firms in the innovating North are born (by inventing a new product), jump
to their optimal size at once, produce, and finally turn inactive instantly (when
their product is copied by the South). Firm life cycles in the South follow a similar
pattern.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section III.2 describes the
basic framework. It introduces supply and demand uncertainty and technology
diffusion. Section III.3 pins down firm profits, cut-off conditions, firm entry, and
proves existence of the balanced growth path. Section III.4 explores firm dynamics
and discusses resulting life cycle patterns. Section III.5 concludes.
III.2 Setup
I consider an infinitely repeated game of symmetric information. All transactions
(costs, revenues, profits,. . . ) are measured in units of the final good.
Countries
There are n ∈ N symmetric countries being located on a circle with constant space
in between neighbors.1 The corresponding metric on {1, . . . , n} is given by
d(i, j) =


0, if |i− j| = 0
|i− j|, if |i− j| ≤ n/2
|(i+ n)− j|, if |i− j| > n/2 and i < j
|i− (j + n)|, if |i− j| > n/2 and i > j.
The greater the distance d(i, j) between two countries i and j, the higher the vari-
able trade costs τij. Let τ : {0, . . . , n/2} → R denote a monotonically increasing
function with τ(0) = 1, then I define τij = τ(d(i, j)). This is the most general form
of increasing iceberg-type trade costs ensuring symmetry, i.e. countries of identi-
cal distance face identical costs. Similarly, there is a demand correlation between
countries that solely depends on the distance d(i, j) as outlined below. Moreover,
each country is populated by a representative household of size L > 0, who supplies
labor inelastically, and who cares about the quantity of a final good C according to
a linear utility function. Hence, per capita utility is u = C/L.
1Without loss of generality I assume n to be an even integer. This is avoids purely technical
case distinctions that do not contribute to a deeper understanding of the economic mechanisms
within this framework.
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Final Good Sector
In each country there is an endogenous mass of producers of differentiated interme-
diate inputs. These inputs either enter the domestic final good sector, or they are
exported and feed into a foreign final good sector. While the final good is freely
tradable, shifting intermediate inputs to a foreign market is subject to iceberg-type
trade costs τij ≥ 1. Let us restrict our attention to one specific final good sector.
Let ω ∈ Ω denote the continuum of all possible intermediate inputs (or firms) in
all countries, and let q(ω) denote the net quantity of the intermediate input ω that
enters this specific final good sector. This quantity is either positive or zero. If the
quantity is positive and the firm ω is located in the same country as the final good
sector net and gross quantities coincide, otherwise net and gross quantities differ ac-
cording to the variable trade cost that arise from shipping the firm’s product. Each
firm ω decides on a certain net quantity q(ω) ≥ 0. In aggregate, those decisions
define a quantity mapping q : Ω → R. Alternatively, we can regard this quantity
mapping as an element of the space of mappings from Ω to R, i.e. q ∈ ΩR. The final
good sector assembles all inputs according to a functional Γ on ΩR which transforms
such quantity mappings q ∈ ΩR into the final good:
Y = Γ(q) = C + I. (III.1)
The final good can be either consumed by households, C, or used as investment
by firms, I. The final good sector is perfectly competitive, implying the identity
of firm revenue and firm surplus. Existence of the general equilibrium (proof of
Proposition 13) requires the restriction to functionals Γ which generate identical
revenue functions rω(q(ω)) = r(q(ω)) for all producers ω ∈ Ω. This means revenue
solely depends on the amount of the net quantity q(ω) and is independent of the
specific variety ω. Moreover, firm revenue r(q(ω)) must exhibit decreasing returns
to scale. This general setting incorporates various model structures. In case all
quantity mappings are Lebesgue integrable and Ω is compact, the standard p-norm
on Lp(Ω,R) would constitute an example for such a functional. Another more
specific example would be the Melitz (2003) framework with Γ denoting the widely
used CES aggregator function.
Supply Uncertainty
There is firm learning and evolution with respect to supply and demand characteris-
tics. The supply-side heterogeneity is a noisy version of the standard Melitz (2003)
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heterogeneity. Each firm is assigned a distribution gα(z) upon its creation that does
not change during its entire life cycle. Every period the firm randomly draws a new
productivity sample from this distribution. If this new productivity level dominates
the old one, the firm switches technology and produces according to this new pro-
ductivity. Hence, the current productivity z of firms is observable. However, their
potential for improvement gα(z) is not. It can only be noisily inferred from the
firm’s productivity sample history. The parameterized family of distributions gα(z),
α ∈ (0,∞) is ordered such that gα(z) first order stochastically dominates gα′(z)
whenever α > α′. Let (zs)t−a≤s≤t denote the history of productivity draws of a firm
of age a in period t, then its current productivity z ∈ (0,∞) equals the maximum
of those draws and its perceived productivity potential h(α) denotes a distribution
assigning every productivity potential α a probability that is consistent with its
productivity sample history. This perceived productivity potential is updated ev-
ery period according to Bayes law. While pricing decisions (affecting the current
period) depend on the current productivity z only, market entry/exit decisions (af-
fecting longer time horizons) also depend on the perceived productivity potential
h(α). Those are the key objects capturing supply uncertainty: The productivity
potential α is the firm’s true type but is unobservable, hence all firm decisions are
based on the firm’s current productivity z, and its perceived productivity potential
h(α).
Demand Uncertainty
The demand-side heterogeneity constitutes a very stylized version of demand un-
certainty. Either there is positive demand for a firm’s product in a certain country,
or demand is hit by a default shock and completely vanishes. Upon its birth, a
firm is assigned a per period default probability δj for each country j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Those default probabilities are unobservable and remain unchanged over the en-
tire firm’s life cycle. They are randomly generated by a publicly observable, joined
distribution v(δ1, . . . , δn). This distribution is identical for all firms in all coun-
tries. Moreover, it is symmetric with respect to countries. Thus, independent of
firm origin, all firms have the identical ex-ante default probability for a certain
market j and this ex-ante default probability for country j coincides with the ex-
ante default probability for any other market l ≤ n. Furthermore, v(δ1, . . . , δn)
introduces positive correlations among default probabilities for different countries
corv : {0, . . . , n/2} → [0, 1] ⊂ R, d(j, l) 7→ corv(d(j, l)) ∈ [0, 1] which solely de-
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pend on country-pair distance d(j, l).2 Admittedly, restricting country demand cor-
relations on d(j, l) is limiting, however, it is the most general form that ensures
country symmetry. Without symmetry the model would loose its simplicity and
tractability. Besides, note that I do not impose any monotonicity assumption on
corv(d(j, l)), i.e. a country could exhibit very similar demand characteristics to
a distant country, while deviating substantially from its neighbor. Upon entering
country j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a firm triggers a publicly observable noisy signal ζj ∈ (0, 1)
of its country specific per period default probability δj ∈ (0, 1). This signal is cor-
rect in expectation. The corresponding perceived default probability distribution
kj,t(δ) in period t is inferred via Bayesian updating based on signals ζi and survival
histories (χi,s)i≤n,t−a≤s<t, again with a denoting firm age. It assigns probabilities to
all possible default probabilities δj that are the most likely given the firm’s demand
signals. If χi,s = 0, the firm has been active in market i in period s, if χi,s = 1,
it has been inactive. If the firm suffers a demand shock, χi,s = 2 is triggered. To
understand updating more closely restrict the model to one country and consider a
firm with a very poor start-up signal. Initially agents expect the firm to default with
a high probability. The longer the firm survives, the less the agents will trust in the
accuracy of its start-up signal and correct the perceived default probability down-
wards. In the limit, the firm could only survive for an infinite number of periods
if its true type was δ = 0. Thus, in the hypothetical one-country case, evolutions
of expected values of perceived default probabilities (Eki,s [δ])t−a≤s≤t constitute seg-
ments of length a of monotonically decreasing sequences that start at Eki,t−a [δ] and
converge towards zero, limt→∞Eki,t [δ] = 0. This result is a direct implication of de-
mand uncertainty. It is solely driven by the unobservability of firms market specific
default probability. For a detailed discussion refer to Felbermayr and Spiegel (2013).
Returning to the multi-country case, the monotonicity of perceived type evolutions
is not guaranteed anymore. It is violated by the introduction of demand correlations
among countries: If a firm receives a negative demand signal in a country that is
positively correlated to country j, it will turn less optimistic about kj(δ). Hence,
perceived types will fluctuate up and down in the course of a firm’s live and exhibit
an downward drift whenever there are no demand shocks.
Technology Diffusion
Apart from firm supply and demand uncertainty, there is one more source of dynam-
ics. There are knowledge spillovers from incumbents to entrants. Start-ups observe
2With a slight abuse of notation, I use corv(d(j, l)) and corv(δj , δl) interchangeably.
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production techniques of existing firms and imperfectly apply them to their product.
In line with Sampson (2014), I assume that entrants draw their productivity type
from a distribution that depends on the productivity distribution of incumbents.
Let met−1(α), m
i
t−1(α) denote the probability density function (pdf) of entrant, re-
spectively incumbent productivity potentials in period t−1, then the pdf of entrants
in period t is given by:
met (α) = (1− ϑ)m
e
t−1(α) + ϑm
i
t−1(α).
The parameter ϑ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the speed of technology diffusion: If ϑ = 0, there
is no technology diffusion. New firms draw their productivity α from a constant
distributionmet (α) = m
e(α) in all periods t. This corresponds to the standard Melitz
(2003) setting. If ϑ = 1, technology diffusion is very high. The distribution of start-
ups completely resembles the distribution of incumbents met (α) = m
i
t−1(α). For any
ϑ > 0 the general equilibrium does not constitute a steady state, but a balanced
growth path. While the distribution of productivity potentials (mit(α))t≥0 represents
a traveling wave with an increasing lower bound, the minimum current productivity
zmin does not necessarily increase. This depends on the precise specification of gα(z).
However, as gα(z) first order stochastically dominates gα′(z) whenever α > α
′, the
incumbent distribution of current productivities also pushes more and more weight
to higher values of z, and its average z¯t increases monotonically with respect to t.
Timing of Actions and Flow of Information
Each period t consists of five stages. Bayesian updating processes new firm informa-
tion whenever this new information is generated, during all stages. s = 1: Inactive
firms may turn active by sinking the start-up investment K and are assigned their
type (α, (δi)i≤n) which is randomly generated by ex-ante type distributions m
e
t (α)
and v(δ1, . . . , δn) respectively. While the firm type is not revealed, ex-ante type dis-
tributions are publicly observable. s = 2: Active firms receive a new productivity
draw zt randomly generated by gα(z) and switch current productivity in case zt > z.
Perceived productivity potentials h(α) are updated. s = 3: Active firms may decide
to enter, to re-enter, or to exit markets consecutively. So informations gathered by
entering, can be used to assess further entry-/exit-decisions within the same stage.
Upon entering a market j, firms incur entry costs F and trigger a market specific
demand shock probability signal ζj. Re-entry also generates fix costs F but does not
trigger a new signal ζj. Perceived default probabilities (ki(δ))i≤n are updated. s = 4:
Active firms produce and generate profits. s = 5: Demand shocks are evaluated. A
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firm (α, (δi)i≤n) that serves market j is hit by a demand shock with probability δj.
Perceived default probabilities (ki(δ))i≤n are updated again.
III.3 Balanced Growth Path
Firm Learning
Firm learning depends on three categories of data: The firm’s true type, its observ-
able type, and its information set. Firm dynamics are driven by the firm’s true type,
but as it is unobservable decisions are based on firm’s observable type which in turn
is derived from the signals the firm triggered in previous periods, its information
set. The true type of a firm: (
α, (δi)i≤n
)
, (III.2)
is given by the firm’s true productivity potential α (respectively gα(z)) and its true
demand shock probability in all markets (δi)i≤n. It remains unchanged in time. As
it is unknown decisions in period t are based on the firm’s observable type:
(
z, h(α), (ki(δ))i≤n
)
t
, (III.3)
consisting of its current productivity z, its perceived productivity potential h(α),
and its perceived default probabilities (ki(δ))i≤n. The firm’s observable type is
inferred via Bayesian updating based on the firm’s information set:
(
(zs)t−a≤s<t, (ζi)i≤n, (χi,s)i≤n,t−a≤s<t
)
, (III.4)
comprising all its productivity samples (zs)t−a≤s<t, its market entry signals (ζi)i≤n,
and its complete survival history (χi,s)i≤n,t−a≤s<t. The parameters a and n denote
firm age and number of countries respectively.
Entry, Exit, Re-Entry and Firm Death
Entering or re-entering markets incurs initial fixed costs F > 0. The market entry
signal ζi is only triggered in case the firm enters country i for the first time, re-entry
does not trigger a new signal. In line with Melitz (2003), firms may invest whenever
investment costs (K or F ) are balanced by investment returns in expectation. There
are two possibilities that a firm leaves a market. Either it decides to leave the market
endogenously, or it is hit by a demand shock. Either way, it can re-enter upon paying
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the fixed payment F . Only if a firm is not active in any market it is dead and can not
re-enter. As all δi are strictly positive, the probability of suffering a demand shock
in all markets simultaneously is strictly positive too. Hence, no firm survives for an
infinite number of periods even if the speed of technology diffusion equals zero. If
there is positive technology diffusion some firms will be hit by such a default shock
and exit, and some will be diminished by monotonically increasing productivities of
competitors and finally exit voluntarily. I refer to the first option as exogenous firm
death, and to the second as endogenous firm death.
Per Period Operating Profits
Let us first discuss per period operating profits of firms in a stationary environment
without technology diffusion, i.e. ϑ = 0, and consider the general case, ϑ > 0, in
step two. A firm (z, h, k) = (z, h(α), (ki(δ))i≤n) needs ℓ = q/z units of labor in order
to produce q units of output. Hence, a firm (z, h, k) located in country i realizes:
πij(z, h, k) = max
q∈R+
{
r(q)− wτij
q
z
− Ekj [δ]f
}
(III.5)
per period operating profit from serving market j. The first term denotes firm
revenue. The second term denotes labor costs: Given variable trade costs τij, the
net quantity q corresponds to a gross quantity τijq, which in turn results in labor
demand ℓ = τijq/z. The factor w denotes the wage rate in country i, and by
symmetry, in all countries l ≤ n. The last term, the component Ekj [δ]f is generated
by periodically arising flow fix costs f : In order to serve market j the firm has to
invest f upfront. This investment is recovered at the end of the period if the firm
is not hit by a demand shock on market j, otherwise it is lost, yielding an expected
loss of Ekj [δ]f . Let us discuss some properties of πij(z, h, k): Finite labor supply L
and smooth firm revenue r(q) ensures finiteness of per period operating profits for
all firms. Hence, assuming z > 0 identity (III.5) constitutes a well defined function.
Moreover, as z directly affects πij(z, h, k) solely via labor demand ℓ = τijq/z, a firm’s
operating profit increases in its current productivity. Next we consider the general
case ϑ > 0. If there is positive technology diffusion the general equilibrium does
not constitute a steady state but a balanced growth path. Hence, both the revenue
function rt(q) and the wage rate wt depend on t. Thus, a firm (z, h, k) located in
country i that delivers a net quantity q to market j in period t realizes operating
profits:
πij,t(z, h, k) = max
q∈R+
{
rt(q)− wtτij
q
z
− Ekj [δ]f
}
. (III.6)
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For each period t the firm’s operating profit (III.6) behaves like the firm’s operating
profit in a stationary environment (III.5). The properties discussed above remain
valid. However, the formula gained an additional dimension that was invisible be-
fore: Per period profits do not only change with respect to firm type, but also with
respect to period t. Given positive technology diffusion, average current produc-
tivities of incumbents (z¯s)s≥t constitute a monotonically increasing sequence. As
labor supply L is constant, this increases firm competition on the labor market and
leads to crowding out of firms that were able to generate positive profits in previous
periods. Hence, all else equal (especially assuming the current productivity z to be
constant) operating profits πij,t(z, h, k) decrease in t. With the help of country spe-
cific per period operating profits, we can now pin down total per period operating
profits. Let Λ = P{1, . . . , n} denote the power set of {1, . . . , n}, and let λt ∈ Λ de-
note the subset of markets a firm (z, h, k) serves in period t, then its total operating
profit is given by:
πiλt(z, h, k) =
∑
j∈λt
πij,t(z, h, k). (III.7)
From the discussion of πij,t(z, h, k) follows that πiλt(z, h, k) is well defined, it in-
creases in z, and decreases in t.
Total Firm Profits
Total profits do not only depend on current productivities z but also on the future
productivity evolution. The future productivity evolution is inferred from the firm’s
perceived potential h. Let ψs(z
′|z, h) denote the perceived switching probability
of a firm (z, h) to switch to productivity z′ in s periods, then the firm’s expected
operating profit in s periods is given by Eψs [πij,s].
3 Hence, the firm expects to
generate:
Πij,t
(
z, h, k
)
=
∑
s≥t
Ekj ,ψs
[
(1− δ)s−tπij,s(z, h, k)
]
− F (III.8)
total profits from selling its product to market j. F denotes initial market entry
costs. Again let λt ∈ Λ denote the markets the firm serves in period t. Then,
total profits of this firm do not merely constitute a sum of market specific profits
3I call ψs perceived switching probability because it depends on the perceived productivity po-
tential h(α) and therefore deviates from the true switching probability which would depend on the
firm’s true type α. As firms switch technology only if the new productivity sample dominates their
current productivity, it holds ψs(z
′|z, h) = 0 whenever z′ < z. The longer the firm’s productivity
sample history (zs)t−a≤s≤t the higher the probability for a high productivity draw. Hence, the
expected current productivity in period s dominates the expected current productivity in period
s′, Eψs [z] ≥ Eψs′ [z], whenever s > s
′.
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∑
j∈λt
Πij,t(z, h, k). The reason is that serving a new market changes the firm’s profit
and decreases its death probability at the same time. Consider a purely domestic
firm. If it suffers a demand shock it is dead. Had it been active in another country
it would have survived and could re-enter the home market in the next period.
Hence, entry in a new country does not only affect profits generated within this new
country, but also potentially positive profits in other markets that would be lost in
case of exogenous firm death. Total profits of a firm (z, h, k) serving markets λt ∈ Λ
are given by:
Πiλt
(
z, h, k
)
=
∑
s≥t
∑
λt∈Λ
Ek,ψs
[
ρλs(z, h, k)πiλs(z, h, k)− |λs\λs−1|F
]
, (III.9)
with ρλs(z, h, k) denoting the probability of serving markets λs in period s ≥ t and
|λs\λs−1| denoting the cardinality of the set λs\λs−1, i.e. the number of markets
the firm would enter in case of λs. In this notation the firm’s default probability is
given by ρλs=∅(z, h, k) with ∅ ∈ Λ denoting the empty set. An explicit derivation of
those probabilities is provided in the Appendix within the proof of Proposition 13.
Cut Off Conditions
Let Λ−j = {λ ∈ Λ|λ ∩ {j} = ∅}, Λ+j = {λ ∈ Λ|j ∈ λ} ⊂ Λ denote the set of all
subsets of {1, . . . , n} that do not, respectively do contain j. Consider a firm that
serves markets λt−1 ∈ Λ−j in period t−1. Then, this firm is not active on market j.
It enters market j in period t if total profits given entry, λt ∈ Λ+j, dominate total
profits given non-entry, λt ∈ Λ−j:
Πiλt∈Λ+j
(
z, h, k
)
≥ Πiλt∈Λ−j
(
z, h, k
)
. (III.10)
Analogously, a firm that is active in market j, λt−1 ∈ Λ+j, endogenously exits the
market in period t if total profits given exit dominate total profits given non-exit:
Πiλt∈Λ−j
(
z, h, k
)
≥ Πiλt∈Λ+j
(
z, h, k
)
. (III.11)
As I verify in the proof of Proposition 13 these conditions yield unique current
productivity cut-off values for entry, z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k), and exit, z
∗∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k).
Firm Entry and General Equilibrium
The mass of entrants M et in period t is pinned down by the free entry condition:
4
Emet [Πi∅(z, h, k)] = K. (III.12)
4By symmetry the mass Met coincides in all countries. Therefore I neglect country indices.
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The left hand side denotes total profits an inactive firm (λt−1 = ∅) expects to
generate by turning active. Emet [·] denotes the expected value with respect to the ex-
ante productivity distributionmet (α). The left hand side decreases inM
e
t : Increasing
the mass of entrants decreases future operating profits πij,s≥t(z, h, k). The right hand
side constitutes the start-up investment firms have to conduct to turn active. Its
value is constant. Hence, restricting F > 0 to lie in between limMet→∞Emet [Πi∅] = 0
and limMet→0Emet [Πi∅] > 0, condition (III.12) closes the model and ensures positive
and finite mass of entrants 0 < M et < ∞ and in turn a positive and finite mass of
incumbents 0 < M it <∞.
5
Proposition 13. Given identical initial conditions met=0(α), m
i
t=0(α) in all coun-
tries j ≤ n, there exists a symmetric general equilibrium such that firm profit is
given by (III.9), cut-off values are defined by (III.10) and (III.11), and firm entry
solves (III.12) for every t ≥ 0.
Proof: Appendix.
The focus is on existence. Uniqueness is neglected. The reason is our sole interest in
exploring individual firm life cycles. I am not interested in analyzing or comparing
aggregate outcomes or dynamics or discussing aspects of firm distributions. There-
fore I do not distinguish between two different general equilibria that give rise to
identical firm profit (III.9). Both yield identical firm life cycles. Hence, they belong
to the same equivalence class with respect to their implications, i.e. all outcomes
are independent of their possible difference.
III.4 Firm Life Cycles
Having introduced the model structure and the general equilibrium above, the next
step is to explore individual firm decisions within this framework. I do not consider
any macro shocks, and let the system to evolve according to the balanced growth
path specified in Proposition (13).
Current Productivity Dynamics
Consider a firm with true productivity potential α. Then its productivity samples
are randomly generated with respect to the distribution gα(z). Whenever a new
5Here I implicitly assume that the costs f and K are sufficiently small for limMe
t
→0Eme
t
[Πi∅]
to be strictly positive.
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productivity sample zt dominates its current productivity z it switches to this new
productivity z = zt. As the true productivity potential α is fixed and does not
change over the firm’s life cycle, the probability of a productivity draw zt that
increases a firm’s current productivity z = max{zt−a, . . . , zt} decreases in firm age
a. Let △tz denote a firm’s current productivity change in period t, i.e. △tz =
max{zt−a, . . . , zt} −max{zt−a, . . . , zt−1} and consider two firms (z, h, k) that solely
differ in age a > a′. Then, the young firm is more likely to experience a positive
productivity shock, Proba′ [∆tz > 0] > Proba[∆tz > 0]. Moreover, given a positive
productivity shock, the shock of the young firm is higher in expectation. This means,
Egα [∆tz|∆tz > 0] decreases in firm age.
Corollary 5. Productivity shocks are either positive or zero. The likelihood and the
expected size of positive productivity shocks decrease in firm age.
Perceived Productivity Dynamics
A firm with perceived productivity potential h(α) expects its productivity sam-
ples zt to be distributed according to Eh[gα(z)]. If a productivity sample zt domi-
nates the expected value of this distribution, i.e. zt > Eh[Egα [z]], than it is better
than expected and prompts the firm to become more optimistic about its perceived
productivity potential h(α). If zt is smaller than Eh[Egα [z]], the firm turns less
optimistic about h(α). As gα(z) first order stochastically dominates gα′(z) when-
ever α ≥ α′, turning more or less optimistic about h(α) corresponds to shifting
weight to higher or lower values of α respectively. To formalize the change in op-
timism, consider total firm profit Πiλt−1(z, h, k). For given values of z, k and λt−1,
it constitutes an ordering on the set of Lebesgue integrable functions on [0, 1] via
Πiλt−1(z, ·, k) : L
1[0, 1] → R, h 7→ Πiλt−1(z, h, k). Suppose the firm’s perceived pro-
ductivity potential equals ht−1 in period t − 1 and ht in period t. Then I define
the size of belief revision in period t via ∆th = Πiλt−1(z, ht, k) − Πiλt−1(z, ht−1, k).
Thus ∆th captures the relative impact of ht and ht−1 on total firm profit all else
equal. Positive values of △th correspond to increasing optimism, negative values to
decreasing optimism.
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Corollary 6. Firms can get more or less optimistic about their productivity poten-
tial. Belief revisions ∆th depend on productivity samples (zs)t−a≤s<t:
zt > Eh[Egα [z]] ⇒ △th > 0,
zt = Eh[Egα [z]] ⇒ △th = 0,
zt < Eh[Egα [z]] ⇒ △th < 0.
Moreover, the expected size of belief revisions decreases in firm age.
The last point follows from decreasing impact of new productivity samples zt in firm
age: Suppose there is a firm that survives for an infinite number of periods. Then,
its productivity sample z∞ has zero significance relative to its productivity sample
history (zs)s≤∞.
Perceived Demand Dynamics
Consider a firm with observable type (z, h(α), (ki(δ))i≤n)t and information set
((zs)t−a≤s<t, (ζi)i≤n, (χi,s)i≤n,t−a≤s<t). There are three events that trigger changes
in its perceived demand risk kj(δ) for country j: New demand signals ζl, survival
information χl,t = 0 and demand shocks χl,t = 2. Whenever a demand signal
ζl is above its expected value ζl > Ekl [δ], it causes an upward correction of the
corresponding belief. This means kl(δ) shifts weight towards high values of δ. If
markets l and j are correlated, this upward correction of kl(δ) yields an upward
correction of kj(δ) and the firm turns less optimistic about its demand stability
in market j. Analogously χl,t = 0, χl,t = 2 triggers a downward respectively an
upward adjustment of kj(δ). The stronger the demand correlation between mar-
ket j and l, the greater the impact of these belief revisions. Similarly to △th, I
define the size of such a belief revision △tkj with respect to the relative impact
of kj,t−1 and kj,t on total firm profit. Let k−j = (ki(δ))i≤n,i 6=j denote all perceived
demand risks except kj(δ). Then, for given values of z, h, k−j and λt−1, total
firm profits constitute an ordering on the space of Lebesgue integrable functions
on [0, 1] via Πiλt−1(z, h, k−j, ·) : L
1(0, 1) → R, kj 7→ Πiλt−1(z, h, k−j, kj). Defining
∆tkj = Πiλt−1(z, h, k−j, kj,t) − Πiλt−1(z, h, k−j, kj,t−1), positive values of ∆tkj corre-
spond to increasing optimism, and negative values to decreasing optimism.
Corollary 7. Firms can get more or less optimistic about their demand stability in
country j. Belief revisions ∆tkj depend on market entry signals (ζl)l≤n and survival
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histories (χl,s)l≤n,t−a≤s<t on correlated markets l ≤ n:
ζl > Ekl [δ] ⇒ △kj < 0,
ζl < Ekl [δ] ⇒ △kj > 0,
χl,t = 0 ⇒ △kj > 0,
χl,t = 2 ⇒ △kj < 0.
The stronger the correlation between market j and l, the higher the expected size of
belief revisions triggered by market l.
Entry-/Exit-Dynamics
Firm decisions are based on a comparison of costs and benefits. Market entry costs
arise from F , expected costs from staying active arise from f . Benefits from market
entry correspond to additional operating profits (III.6) and a decreasing exogenous
firm death probability. The comparison of these costs and benefits is implicitly
carried out by comparing the value of firms current productivities z with cut-off
values for entry z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k) and exit z
∗∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k). As f constitutes the sole
source of fixed costs from staying active, it follows z∗∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k) → 0 for f → 0.
And as the sole cost difference of entry and of staying active is given by F , it
follows z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k) > z
∗∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k) whenever F > 0, and z
∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k) →
z∗∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k) for F → 0.
Corollary 8 (Cut off values). There is no endogenous market exit if flow fixed costs
vanish:
z∗∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k)→ 0 for f → 0.
Cut off productivities for entry and exit converge if market entry costs vanish:
z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k)→ z
∗∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k) for F → 0.
Whenever entry is costly, it only occurs at strictly higher productivity levels than
exit:
z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k) > z
∗∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k) if F > 0.
Firms entry- and exit-dynamics are completely determined by the movement of
the firm’s current productivity and its cut off values. Consider a firm (z, h, k)
that serves markets λt−1 ∈ Λ−j in period t − 1, i.e. it is not active in country
j. If the size of its current productivity or the size of the entry cut-off changes,
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and the new value of z dominates the new cut-off value z > z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k), the
firm enters market j. It does not matter which value moves in which direction.
Only their relative size in period t matters. Analogously, the firm exits market j
if λt−1 ∈ Λj and z drops below z
∗∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k). The evolution of z is specified in
Corollary 5. Holding λt−1 and t fixed, the evolution of cut-off values is completely
determined by the movement of h and k. These are specified in Corollary 6 and
Corollary 7. If the firm becomes more optimistic, i.e. ∆th > 0 or ∆tkj > 0,
expected total profits Πij,t
(
z, h, k
)
=
∑
s≥tEkj ,ψs
[
(1−δ)s−tπij,s(z, h, k)
]
−F increase
and cut-off values z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k), z
∗∗
ij,t(λt−1, h, k) drop. Finally, for given values of
h, k both cut-off productivities z∗ij,t(λ ∈ Λ−j, h, k), z
∗∗
ij,t(λ ∈ Λj, h, k) increase in
t. This effect is driven by technology diffusion ϑ > 0: The average productivity
of competitors (z¯s)0≤s≤t increases monotonically, slowly crowding out firms whose
current productivity evolution (zs)t−a≤s≤t is not keeping pace. If ϑ = 0, then cut off
values are constant with respect to t.
Corollary 9 (Entry). Opening up to new markets j ≤ n is always preceded by pos-
itive productivity shocks △tz > 0, or positive belief revisions △th > 0, △tkj > 0.
Thus, entry only occurs after sufficiently good productivity samples zt > min(z,
Eh[Egα [z]]) or affirmative demand signals ζl > Ekl [δ], χl,t = 0 on positively corre-
lated markets l ≤ n.
While entry only occurs after positive signals, positive signals do not always imply
entry. Positive signals can even be followed by market exit: Given positive technol-
ogy diffusion cut off values feature a constant upward drift in t. If a firm receives
a positive signal, but this signal is not sufficiently good to outbalance the upward
drift of the cut off value for a certain market, the firm might still find it optimal to
exit this market. Another characteristic of market exit is its increased appearance
directly after entry: Every period a firm is active in a certain market it generates
some survival information χj,t. Only in its first period of activity it additionally
generates the market entry signal ζj. Thus, expected belief revisions with respect
to demand signals triggered by this market are most volatile during the first period
of activity.
Corollary 10 (Exit). There is exogenous and endogenous market exit. Exogenous
exit occurs if a firm is hit by a demand shock. Endogenous exit occurs either because
the firm observed negative demand signals on correlated markets, i.e. ∆tkj < 0,
or because it got more pessimistic about its productivity potential, i.e. ∆th < 0. If
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there is positive technology diffusion ϑ > 0, endogenous exit can also be caused by
the monotonically increasing average productivity of competitors. Endogenous exit
is most likely directly after entry.
Firm Expansion and Shrinkage
Consider a firm located in country i. From the firm’s perspective, markets j and
l solely differ in variable trade costs τij, τil and perceived demands kj(δ), kl(δ).
Their relationship completely determines the firm’s entry decision: The lower the
variable trade costs and the lower the perceived demand risk, the higher ex-ante
expected total profits from entering the market. Suppose the firm has just been
created and received a start-up demand signal ζi that is better than average. Then,
it also expects better-than-average demand characteristics in positively correlated
countries. The higher the correlation the stronger the positive effect. In case the firm
starts exporting and there were no variable trade costs, it would enter the market
with the highest demand correlation first. Possibly, this market is not a neighboring
country. This solely depends on the correlation corv(δi, δj). So possibly a firm might
find it profitable to export to the most distant market first. In case of positive
variable trade costs the firm might find it more profitable to not deviate that far
from its home country. Suppose now the firm starts with a demand stability signal
ζi below average, then it would seek markets with low correlation for exporting. The
same holds true for all other firms analogously: Any firm prefers to enter markets
that are geographically close to its home country in order to minimize variable trade
costs and that are strongly correlated to markets that exhibit a robust demand for
the firm’s product. Hence, the pattern of a firm’s expansion path is determined by
the trade-off between perceived demand characteristics kj(δ) and variable trade costs
τij. As variable trade costs are identical for all firms, expansion path differences are
driven by idiosyncratic demand signal histories. Depending on the variable trade
cost function τij = τ(d(i, j)) and the correlation corv(δi, δj) any expansion path is
possible.
Corollary 11 (Expansion path). Expanding firms prefer new destinations with low
variable trade costs, that are strongly correlated with existing markets exhibiting
robust demand for the firm’s product. Idiosyncratic expansion paths of different
firms are driven by their idiosyncratic demand signal histories.
Excluding degenerate distributions gα(z), that assign their entire density to one
outcome z′, expected productivity growth is strictly positive for young firms (see
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Corollary 5). Choosing a sufficiently low technology diffusion ϑ > 0, expected cur-
rent productivity growth rates of young firms are higher than expected growth rates
of cut off productivities.6 As long as current productivity growth rates dominate
cut off productivity growth rates, firms will expand into more and more countries.
However, as firms turn older, expected current productivity growth rates converge
towards zero. Hence, from some age onwards, expected growth of cut off produc-
tivities dominates expected growth of current productivities and firms start exiting
countries. Assuming a sufficiently small technology diffusion ϑ > 0, it follows:
Corollary 12 (Firm life cycle). If a firm is not hit by an exogenous death shock its
life cycle consists of firm birth, firm expansion (while firm’s expected current pro-
ductivity growth dominates expected growth of cut off productivities), firm shrinkage
(when firm’s expected current productivity growth drops below expected growth of cut
off productivities), and finally firm death when the firm endogenously exits the last
market.
A firm is dead if it is not active on any market. There is endogenous and exoge-
nous firm death. If a firm decides to exit its last market because its expected total
profit turns negative, it dies endogenously. If a firm expects to generate positive
total profits and is hit by a demand shock on all its markets simultaneously, it dies
exogenously. Hence, a firm’s exogenous death probability is given by the product of
all demand shock risks Πj∈λδj of all the markets it serves j ∈ λ. Consider two newly
created firms that solely differ in their productivity potential α > α′. Then the firm
with the higher productivity potential exhibits higher expected current productivi-
ties, Eψt,α [z] > Eψt,α′ [z] for all t, and chooses a later period for endogenous exit in
expectation. This introduces a negative correlation between productivity potential
and endogenous firm death. Moreover, the firm with the higher productivity poten-
tial enters more markets in expectation. As all demand shock risks attain values in
between zero and one, the more countries the firm is active in the lower its exoge-
nous death probability Πj∈λδj. Hence, productivity potential and exogenous death
probability are also correlated negatively.
Corollary 13 (Firm Death). Endogenous and exogenous death probabilities are
negatively correlated with firm productivity.
6Choosing ϑ = 0 growth rates of cut off productivities are zero. By continuity of the model,
those growth rates can be decreased arbitrarily by choosing a sufficiently small ϑ.
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III.5 Conclusion
This chapter replicates gradual firm growth and decay in open economies by com-
bining three approaches that have hitherto been studied separately. First, there
is supply uncertainty leading to gradual improvement of production techniques on
firm level. Second, there is demand uncertainty resulting in firm specific expansion
paths. Third, there are knowledge spillovers which constantly intensify competition
and lead to crowding out of old firms.
Each firm is assigned an unobservable productivity distribution upon its birth. This
distribution generates a new productivity sample every period. Whenever a new
productivity sample dominates the firm’s current productivity it switches technology
and produces according to this new productivity. This generates firm growth and
firm learning (from observing lengthening sample histories). Firm learning has no
effect on firm productivities, but it makes firms more or less optimistic about their
future productivity evolution, and via this channel influences market entry/exit
decisions. Furthermore, each firm is assigned an unobservable per period demand
shock probability for every country. Demand is either positive or - when hit by a
shock - completely vanishes. Firms can learn about these market specific default
probabilities by various means. As demand characteristics are positively correlated
across countries, firm learning for a specific country also comprises observing demand
signals in other countries. Firm specific demand signals entail firm specific learning
and result in firm specific expansion paths. However, generally, more productive
firms enter more markets. This generates a positive correlation of firm productivity
and firm life expectancy. Finally, there are knowledge spillovers from incumbent
firms to entrants. Start-ups draw their productivity type from a distribution that
depends on the productivity type distribution of existing firms. This generates
monotonically increasing average productivities and results in crowding out of firms
that are not able to keep pace with the industry average.
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Appendix A
A Simple Theory of Trade,
Finance, and Firm Dynamics
A.1 Baseline Model
Existence and Uniqueness of Cut-Off Values
Starting with (I.9) and applying (I.7), we get:
K/G(δ∗d) = Eg(π
n(δ)/δ|δ ≤ δ∗d)
= Eg(π
n
d (δ)/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
d) + (G(δ
∗
x)/G(δ
∗
d))Eg(nπ
n
x(δ)/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
x)
= Eg((δ
∗
d − δ)fd/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
d) + (G(δ
∗
x)/G(δ
∗
d))Eg(n(δ
∗
x − δ)fx/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
x)
= fd(δ
∗
dEg(1/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
d)− 1) + nfx(G(δ
∗
x)/G(δ
∗
d))(δ
∗
xEg(1/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
x)− 1),
yielding:
fdG(δ
∗
d)(δ
∗
dEg(1/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
d)− 1) + nfxG(δ
∗
x)(δ
∗
xEg(1/δ|δ ≤ δ
∗
x)− 1) = K. (A.1)
Replacing δ∗x by δ
∗
d via (I.8), the left hand side of (A.1) is a continuous function of δ
∗
d
that equals 0 for δ∗d = 0 and is strictly positive for δ
∗
d = 1 as E(1/δ) > 1. Thus, it is
always possible to choose K > 0 sufficiently small in order to ensure the existence of
a solution of (A.1). Uniqueness follows from proof by contradiction: Assume there
are at least two different domestic cut-off values δ♮d < δ
♭
d solving (A.1). Then net per
period profits of firms δ ∈ (δ♮d, δ
♭
d) have to be less or equal to net per period profits
of firm δ♭, which yields a contradiction as net per period profits strictly decrease in
δ.
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Proposition 1
Equation (I.8) exhibits a direct effect τ ↓⇒ δ∗x ↑. As δ
∗
x ↑ yields δ
∗
x ↓ via (A.1) and as
there is no direct effect of τ on (A.1). The statements contained in the Proposition
follow.
Derivation of (I.11)
Labor market clearing L =Mqd+nMxτqx yields wL =M(rd−πd)+nMx(rx−πx) =
M((rd−πd)+nH(δ
∗
x)(rx−πx)). Transforming rd and rx according to (I.4) and (I.6)
and replacing πd and πx via (I.6) we get:
wL = M((rd − πd) + nH(δ
∗
x)(rx − πx)) =M(σπd − πd + nH(δ
∗
x)(σπx − πx))
= M((σ − 1)δ∗dfd + nH(δ
∗
x)(σ − 1)δ
∗
xfx) =M(σ − 1)(δ
∗
dfd + nH(δ
∗
x)δ
∗
xfx)
yielding (I.11).
Derivation of (I.12)
From 1 = P = (Mp1−σd + nMxp
1−σ
x )
1
1−σ we get:
w = w/P = w(Mp1−σd + nMxp
1−σ
x )
1
σ−1 = w(Mp1−σd + nH(δ
∗
x)M(τpd)
1−σ)
1
σ−1
= (w/pd)(1 + nH(δ
∗
x)τ
1−σ)
1
σ−1M
1
σ−1 = ρ(1 + nH(δ∗x)τ
1−σ)
1
σ−1M
1
σ−1 .
Together with C = Lw/P , this implies (I.12).
A.2 Uncertain Firm Types (Symmetric
Countries)
Existence and Uniqueness of Cut-Off Values
Starting with (I.17) and applying (I.15) in the fourth and (I.14) in the fifth step of
the calculation, we get:
K/G(δˆ∗d) = Eg(Ebδˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tπn(δˆt))|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
= Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tπnd (δˆt) + Σ
∞
t=t(δˆ0)
(1− δ)tnπnx(δˆt))|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
= Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tπnd (δˆt))
+Eb
δˆ0
((1− δ)t(δˆ0)Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tnπnx(δˆt(δˆ0)+t))|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
71
A. A Simple Theory of Trade, Finance, and Firm Dynamics
= Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
t(πd − δˆtfd)
+Eb
δˆ0
((1− δ)t(δˆ0)Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tn(πx − δˆt(δˆ0)+tfx))|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
= Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
t((δ¯(δˆ∗d)− δˆt)fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
)))nfx)
+Eb
δˆ0
((1− δ)t(δˆ0)Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
tn(δˆ∗x − δˆt(δˆ0)+t)fx)|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
= Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
t((δ¯(δˆ∗d)− δ¯(δˆ0))fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
)))nfx)
+Eb
δˆ0
((1− δ)t(δˆ0)Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
t(δˆ∗x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ0)))nfx)|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
= Eg(((δ¯(δˆ
∗
d)− δ¯(δˆ0))fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
)))nfx)Ebδˆ0
(1/δ)
+(δˆ∗x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ0)))nfxEbδˆ0
((1− δ)t(δˆ0)/δ)|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
= Eg(((δ¯(δˆ
∗
d)− δ¯(δˆ0))fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
)))nfx
+ψ(δˆ0)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ0)))nfx)Ebδˆ0
(1/δ)|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d)
yielding:
K = G(δˆ∗d)Eg[[(δ¯(δˆ
∗
d)− δ¯(δˆ0))fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ∗
d
)))nfx
+ψ(δˆ0)(δˆ
∗
x − δ¯(δˆt(δˆ0)))nfx]Ebδˆ0
(1/δ)|δˆ0 ≤ δˆ
∗
d], (A.2)
with t(δˆ0) denoting the period in which a firm of start-up perceived type δˆ0 would
enter the export market in case of survival. Existence and uniqueness of the solution
δˆ∗d follows from analog arguments as in the known firm type case.
Effects of trade liberalization
From (I.16) we get ∂δˆ∗x/∂τ < 0, yielding τ ↓⇒ δˆ
∗
x ↑. As ψ(δˆ
∗
d) ≤ ψ(δˆ0) yields the
correspondence δˆ∗x ↑⇒ δˆ
∗
x ↓ via (A.2), and as there is no direct effect of τ on (A.2),
we obtain the claims made in the text.
Derivation of (I.20)
Labor market clearing L =Mqd+nMxτqx yields wL =M(rd−πd)+nMx(rx−πx) =
M(rd−πd+nHˆ(δˆ
∗
x)(rx−πx)). Transforming rd and rx via (I.4) and (??) and replacing
πd and πx according to (I.14), yields:
wL = M(rd − πd + nHˆ(δˆ
∗
x)(rx − πx)
= M(σπd − πd + nHˆ(δˆ
∗
x)(σπx − πx)
= M((σ − 1)(δ¯(δˆ∗d)fd − ψ(δˆ
∗
d)δˆ
∗
xnfx) + nHˆ(δˆ
∗
x)((σ − 1)δˆ
∗
xfx)
= M(σ − 1)(fdδ¯(δˆ
∗
d) + nfx(Hˆ(δˆ
∗
x)− ψ(δˆ
∗
d))δˆ
∗
x),
yielding (I.20).
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Derivation of (I.21)
From 1 = P = (Mp1−σd + nMxp
1−σ
x )
1
1−σ we get:
w = w/P
= w(Mp1−σd + nMxp
1−σ
x )
1
σ−1
= w(Mp1−σd + nHˆ(δˆ
∗
x)M(τpd)
1−σ)
1
σ−1
= (w/pd)(1 + nHˆ(δˆ
∗
x)τ
1−σ)
1
σ−1M
1
σ−1
= ρ(1 + nHˆ(δˆ∗x)τ
1−σ)
1
σ−1M
1
σ−1 .
Together with C = Lw/P , this implies (I.21).
Proposition 8
If a firm starts exporting by a misjudgment of its true type, expected profits from
exporting Σ∞t=0(1 − δ)
tπx are dominated by costs fx. In this case the firm uses up
more units of final good of a country than it produces, yielding a negative welfare
effect. By constructing a specific ex-ante distribution g′ of true and perceived firm
types, we can increase the fraction of firms that enter by misjudgment of their
type almost to 1. Let (δˆ∗x)−1 denote the value of the start-up perceived type that
coincides with the exporting cut-off value after one period of updating and let R =∫ (δˆ∗x)−1
δˆ∗x
g(δˆ0)dδˆ0 denote the fraction of start-up firms δˆ0 within (δˆ
∗
x, (δˆ
∗
x)−1). Then,
those start-up firms will enter foreign markets in their second period of operation,
yielding a negative aggregate welfare effect, as start-up perceived firm types are
correct in expectation. By shifting probability density towards a value δˆ′0 within
the open interval (δˆ∗x, (δˆ
∗
x)−1), we can push R arbitrarily close towards 1.
1 For some
value of R′ (close enough to 1) the negative welfare effect from export entry of firms
belonging to this fraction will outweigh the possibly positive welfare effect from
export entry of the residual 1 − R′. Under such an ex-ante distribution g′ of true
and perceived firm types a change to prohibitive variable trade costs τ → ∞ or
to n → 0 accessible foreign markets increases welfare. Hence, by the mean value
theorem of differential calculus, there exists a τ ′ and a n′ at which liberalizing trade
yields negative welfare effects.
1As this shifting of probability density draws δˆ∗x and (δˆ
∗
x)−1 closer together, δˆ
′
0 has to belong to
the interval subsequent the shifting of probability density. As δˆ∗x < (δˆ
∗
x)−1 for all non-degenerate
distributions g, such a δˆ′0 always exists.
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A.3 Uncertain Firm Types (Asymmetric
Countries)
Existence and Uniqueness of Cut-Off Values
Using the zero cut-off profit conditions πι = δˆ
∗
ι fι and δˆ
∗
ι = (fκ/fι)δˆ
∗
κ we can trans-
form the free entry condition into an equation with only one unknown δˆ∗0:
K = Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
t
∫ κ(δˆt)
0
(πκ − δˆtfκ)dκ))
= Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
t
∫ κ(δˆt)
0
((δˆ∗κ − δˆt)fκ)dκ))
= Eg(Eb
δˆ0
(Σ∞t=0(1− δ)
t
∫ κ(δˆt)
0
((f0/fκ)δˆ
∗
0 − δˆt)fκdκ)) (A.3)
The right hand side of (A.3) is a continuous monotonically increasing function of δˆ∗0.
It equals zero for δˆ∗0 = 0, as in this case all cut-off values vanish δˆ
∗
κ = (f0/fκ)δˆ
∗
0 = 0
and thus no firm will enter into exporting. If δˆ∗0 = 1 all firms will export to country
ι = 0 and to countries with similarly low market entry costs ι = 0 + ǫ.2 Hence∫ κ(δˆ0)
0
((f0/fκ)δˆ
∗
0 − δˆ0)fκdκ > 0 for all δˆ0, yielding a strictly positive right hand side
of (A.3). Thus, for all sufficiently small K > 0, there exists a unique solution δˆ∗0 of
(A.3).
Derivation of (I.25)
From the labor market clearing condition L =
∫ 1
0
Mκτqκdκ, we get:
wL =
∫ 1
0
Mκwτqκdκ =
∫ 1
0
Mκ(pκqκ − (pκ − wτ)qκ)dκ
=
∫ 1
0
Mκ(rκ − πκ)dκ =
∫ 1
0
Mκ(σ − 1)πκdκ
=
∫ 1
0
Mκ(σ − 1)δˆ
∗
κfκdκ =
∫ 1
0
Hˆ(δˆ∗κ)M(σ − 1)δˆ
∗
κfκdκ
= M(σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
Hˆ(δˆ∗κ)δˆ
∗
κfκdκ,
yielding (I.25).
2We assume that market entry costs fι increase continuously in ι.
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Derivation of (I.26)
Determining the country index
Pι =
(∫ 1
0
(∫
Ωκ,ι
p(ωκ,ι)
1−σdωκ,ι
)
dκ
)1/(1−σ)
=
(∫ 1
0
(∫
Ωκ,ι
p1−σι dωκ,ι
)
dκ
)1/(1−σ)
=
(∫ 1
0
p1−σι Mιdκ
)1/(1−σ)
= pιM
1/(1−σ)
ι = w(τ/ρ)(Hˆ(δˆ
∗
ι )M)
1/(1−σ)
and plugging it into P =
( ∫ 1
0
P 1−σι dι
)1/(1−σ)
= w(τ/ρ)
(
M
∫ 1
0
Hˆ(δˆ∗ι )dι
)1/(1−σ)
we
receive C = Lw/P = L(ρ/τ)
(
M
∫ 1
0
Hˆ(δˆ∗ι )dι
)1/(σ−1)
.
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Appendix B
Labor Market Dynamics and
Trade
B.1 Equivalence of Simplified and Competitive
Search Equilibria
Proof of Proposition 11. I show that if Jt solves the recursive equation (II.5), then
St = Jt + At solves the recursive equation (II.8). Suppose At denotes a constant
that does not interfere with the firms maximization problem. Then, whenever a firm
maximizes Jt according to the competitive search setting, it maximizes St = Jt+At
according to the simplified search setting and the resultant equilibrium allocations
are identical. This proves that every competitive search equilibrium allocation con-
stitutes a simplified search equilibrium allocation. The reverse direction follows from
performing the Main Calculation for Jt = St − At.
Main Calculation
Defining:
At(z, a) =
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
1− ηtˆ,t
(
ut(Btˆ)− ut(0)
)
(B.1)
the expression is independent of the firms maximization problem in period t as it only
depends on contracts the firm signed in previous periods tˆ < t and does not depend
on current firm behavior. This allows us to perform step (B.6) below. Applying
(II.6) and (II.7) in step (B.2), (B.11) in step (B.3), (B.1) in step (B.4), (B.10) in
step (B.5), the Bellman Equation for the unemployed ut(0) = b+ ρt+ βut+1(0) and
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(II.6) in step (B.7), and (II.6) in step (B.8) and (B.9) we get:
St(z, a) = Jt(z, a) + At(z, a)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )−W + βJt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a)
}
+At(z, a)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )−
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
wtˆ,tℓtˆ,t − wt,tm(λ)V (B.2)
+βJt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a)
}
+ At(z, a)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )−
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
wtˆ,tℓtˆ,t −
(
b+ βut+1(0) (B.3)
+
λ
m(λ)
ρt
)
m(λ)V + β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) + ut+1(Bt)m(λ)V
}}
+ At(z, a)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
. . .
}
+
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
1− ηtˆ,t
(
ut(Btˆ)− ut(0)
)
(B.4)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
. . .
}
+
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
1− ηtˆ,t
(
[δ + (1− δ)ηtˆ,t]ut(0) (B.5)
+[1− (δ + (1− δ)ηtˆ,t)](wtˆ,t + βut+1(Btˆ))− ut(0)
)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
. . .
}
+
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
1− ηtˆ,t
(
[1− (δ + (1− δ)ηtˆ,t)](wtˆ,t − ut(0) + βut+1(Btˆ))
)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
. . .
}
+ (1− δ)
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
(
wtˆ,t − ut(0) + βut+1(Btˆ)
)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
· · ·+
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
(
wtˆ,t − ut(0) + βut+1(Btˆ)
)}
(B.6)
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )−
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
wtˆ,tℓtˆ,t −
(
b+ βut+1(0)
+
λ
m(λ)
ρt
)
m(λ)V + β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) + ut+1(Bt)m(λ)V
}
+
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
(
wtˆ,t − ut(0) + βut+1(Btˆ)
)}
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )−
(
b+ βut+1(0) +
λ
m(λ)
ρt
)
m(λ)V
+β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) + ut+1(Bt)m(λ)V
}
+
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t
(
− ut(0) + βut+1(Btˆ)
)}
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= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )− ρtλV − (b+ βut+1(0))m(λ)V
−
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,tut(0) + β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) +
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,tut+1(Btˆ) + ut+1(Bt)m(λ)V
}}
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )− ρtλV − (b+ βut+1(0))m(λ)V
−
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,tut(0) + β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) +
t∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,tut+1(Btˆ)
}}
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )− ρtλV − ℓt,t(b+ βut+1(0)) (B.7)
−
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t(b+ ρt + βut+1(0)) + β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) +
t∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,tut+1(Btˆ)
}}
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )− ρtλV − ℓt,tb−
t−1∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t(b+ ρt)
+β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) +
t∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t(ut+1(Btˆ)− ut+1(0))
}}
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )− ρt(ℓt−1 + λV )− b(ℓt−1 + ℓt,t) (B.8)
+β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) +
t∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t(ut+1(Btˆ)− ut+1(0))
}}
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )− ρt(ℓt−1 + λV )− b(ℓt−1 + ℓt,t) (B.9)
+β
{
Jt+1(z, ℓt, (Btˆ)
t
tˆ=t−a) +
t∑
tˆ=t−a
ℓtˆ,t+1
1− ηtˆ,t
(
ut+1(Btˆ)− ut+1(0)
)}}
= max
ι,V,Bt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− C(V )− ρt(ℓt−1 + λV )− b(ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)
+β
{
Jt+1(z, a) + At+1(z, a)
}}
= max
ι,V,λ,ηt
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− b(ℓt−1 + ℓt,t)− µt(ℓt−1 + λV )− C(V )
+βSt+1(z, ℓt)
}
.
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Thus, for ρt = µt, the function St(z, a) = Jt(z, a) + At(z, a) solves the simplified
control problem (II.8).
Auxiliary Calculation
A contract Btˆ signed in period tˆ < t satisfies the recursive equation:
ut(Btˆ) = [δ + (1− δ)ηtˆ,t]ut(0) + [1− (δ + (1− δ)ηtˆ,t)](wtˆ,t + βut+1(Btˆ)). (B.10)
If the firm defaults or the firm-worker match breaks (which happens with probability
δ + (1 − δ)ηtˆ,t) the worker switches to the utility of an unemployed worker ut(0).
If the workers stays employed he receives his salary wtˆ,t and enters the next period
with same contract Btˆ yielding a present value in period t of βut+1(Btˆ). As firm
death and firm-worker match default is impossible directly after signing the contract
(period t, stage s = 3) for the first period of the contract, equation (B.10) transforms
into:
ut(Bt) = wt,t + βut+1(Bt)
and hence:
wt,t = b+ βut+1(0) +
λ
m(λ)
ρt − βut+1(Bt), (B.11)
where we replaced ut(Bt) according to (II.7).
B.2 Firm Policy Functions
Proof of Proposition 12. Surplus of a firm (z, ℓ = ℓt−1) is given by:
S(z, ℓ) = max
ι,V,λ
(1− δ)
{
rι(z, ℓ+ ℓt,t)− b(ℓ+ ℓt,t)− µt(ℓ+ λV )
−C(V ) + βSt+1(z, ℓt)
}
. (B.12)
Employment growth fulfills ℓt,t = m(λ)V and ℓt = (1 − η)(ℓ + ℓt,t). Firm revenue
reads rι(z, ℓ) = zA(ℓ) − fd for ι = d and rι(z, ℓ) = pzA(ℓ)/τ − fx for ι = x, with
A(ℓ) denoting a strictly increasing and concave function with A(0) = 0.
Recruiting Firms
If V ≥ 0, vacancy costs C(V ) are positive, strictly increasing and convex and the
matching function m(λ) is positive, strictly increasing and concave in the worker
job ratio λ. The first part of statement 1 in proposition 12 follows directly from
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comparing domestic and exporting revenues. The second part of statement 1 affords
more work. Without loss of generality we execute following calculation for domestic
firm revenue rι(z, ℓ) = rd(z, ℓ). Differentiating (B.12) with respect to λ and V and
applying the envelope theorem we get:
Sλ(z, ℓ) = (1− δ){zA
′(ℓˆ)m′(λ)V − bm′(λ)V − µV } = 0
⇒ zA′(ℓˆ) = b+ µ/m′(λ), (B.13)
SV (z, ℓ) = (1− δ){zA
′(ℓˆ)m(λ)− bm(λ)− µλ− C ′(V )} = 0
⇒ C ′(V ) = zA′(ℓˆ)m(λ)− bm(λ)− µλ, (B.14)
with ℓˆ = ℓ+ ℓt,t Plugging (B.13) in (B.14) yields:
C ′(V ) = µ
(m(λ)
m′(λ)
− λ
)
. (B.15)
Consider V as a function of λ and differentiate both sides with respect to λ:
C ′′(V )Vλ = µ
(m′(λ)2 −m(λ)m′′(λ)
m′(λ)2
− 1
)
= −µ
(m(λ)m′′(λ)
m′(λ)2
)
.
From the convexity of C(V ) and the concavity of m(λ) it follows Vλ > 0, i.e.
the higher the number of vacancies V a firm posts the higher the unemployment
vacancy ratio λ of the sub market it targets. Applying the implicit function theorem
on (B.13) (in the form K(λ, z, ℓ) = zA′(ℓˆ)−µ/m′(λ)− b = 0) we can determine the
effect of z and ℓ on λ:
Kz(λ, z, ℓ) = A
′(ℓˆ) > 0,
Kℓ(λ, z, ℓ) = zA
′′(ℓˆ) < 0,
Kλ(λ, z, ℓ) = zA
′′(ℓˆ)
(
m′(λ)V +m(λ)Vλ
)
+ µ
m′′(λ)
m′(λ)2
< 0
and hence
λz(z, ℓ) =
Kz(λ, z, ℓ)
Kλ(λ, z, ℓ)
> 0, λℓ(z, ℓ) =
Kℓ(λ, z, ℓ)
Kλ(λ, z, ℓ)
< 0.
From (B.15) and Vλ > 0, it follows:
Vz(z, ℓ) > 0, Vℓ(z, ℓ) < 0.
Thus, the higher the firms productivity z the more vacancies V it posts and the
higher the worker job ratio λ it targets. The reverse is true for firm size ℓ.
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Shrinking Firms
Again the first part of the statement follows from comparing domestic and export
revenue. Before we prove the second part of the statement we want to show that
it is indeed equivalent for firms to separate from workers by choosing a separation
probability ηt−1 > η, or to separate from workers by choosing negative vacancies
V < 0, in which case we impose λ = 1, m(λ) == 1 and C(V ) == 0. In order
to prove equivalence we show that a firm can generate identical surplus rι(z, ℓt−1 +
ℓt,t)−b(ℓt−1+ ℓt,t)−µt(ℓt−1+λV )−C(V ) in period t (see (B.12)) by either strategy.
From ηt−1 > η and V = 0 follows ℓt−1 = (1 − ηt−1)ℓt−2 and ℓt,t = 0, and surplus
equals rι(z, (1− ηt−1)ℓt−2)− (b+µ)((1− ηt−1)ℓt−2). If ηt−1 = η, V < 0, C(V ) == 0,
λ = 1 and m(λ) == 1 we get ℓt−1 = (1 − η)ℓt−2 and ℓt,t = V < 0 yielding surplus
rι(z, (1− η)ℓt−2 + V )− (b+ µ)((1− η)ℓt−2 + V ). Hence, for V = (η − ηt−1)ℓt−2 < 0
both strategies coincide. We proceed to prove the second part of the statement. If
C(V ) == 0, λ = 1 and m(λ) == 1, the first order condition of (B.12) with respect
to V reads:
SV (z, ℓ) = zA
′(ℓ+ V )− b− µ = 0.
It follows V = (A′)−1((b+ µ)/z)− ℓ which completes the proof of the second state-
ment.
Exiting Firms
If a firm is not able to generate positive surplus it chooses V = −ℓ and turns inactive
endogenously.
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Firm Life Cycles in a Global
Economy
C.1 Balanced Growth Path
Proof of Proposition 13. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, I calculate market
supply probabilities ρλs , which are needed to determine total profits Πiλt(z, h, k) =∑
s≥t
∑
λs∈Λ
Ek,ψs [ρλs(z, h, k)πiλs(z, h, k)− |λs\λs−1|F ] defined in (III.9). Second, I
verify existence and uniqueness of the cut-off values for entry z∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k) and exit
z∗∗ij,t(λt−1, h, k) defined via (III.10) and (III.11). Third, I show how the free entry
condition (III.12) pins down the general equilibrium.
Market Supply Probabilities
Consider a firm (z, h, k) in period t. For a specific λs ∈ Λ the expression ρλs(z, h, k)
denotes the probability that this firm will serve markets λs ∈ Λ in t+s periods. This
probability of activity in λs depends on the firms destinations λt+s−1 in the previous
period. Hence, ρλs depends on ρλs−1 whenever s > t. Only ρλt can be determined
directly. It equals one if λt represents the firms actual destinations in period t,
otherwise it equals zero. Let ρλs−1→λs denote the firms probability to switch from
λs−1 to λs, then we have:
ρλs =
∑
λs−1∈Λ
ρλs−1ρλs−1→λs . (C.1)
The sum collects all possible previous states λs−1 ∈ Λ and multiplies their probabil-
ity ρλs−1 with the corresponding switching-probability ρλs−1→λs . This adds up the
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probabilities of all possible paths leading to λs. The switching-probability can be
factorized into three components:
ρλs−1→λs = ρ
co
λs−1→λsρ
en
λs−1→λsρ
ex
λs−1→λs . (C.2)
The probability ρcoλs−1→λs that the firm continues serving markets λs−1∩λs, the prob-
ability ρenλs−1→λs that it enters markets λs\(λs−1 ∩ λs), and the probability ρ
ex
λs−1→λs
that it exits markets λs−1\(λs−1 ∩ λs). If and only if all conditions that are ex-
pressed by those probabilities are fulfilled, the firm switches from λs−1 to λs. Let
z∗ij,s and z
∗∗
ij,s denote the cut-off productivities for endogenous entry into, respectively
endogenous exit from market j. If λs−1 ∩ λs = ∅ there is no market the firm needs
to continue serving in order to switch from λs−1 to λs. In this case ρ
co
λs−1→λs
= 1. If
λs−1 ∩ λs 6= ∅ then:
ρcoλs−1→λs =
∑
ι∈P (λs−1∩λs)
Ek,ψs [Πl∈ιδl(1−Ψs(z
∗
il,s))Πm∈(λs−1∩λs)\ι(1−δm)(1−Ψs(z
∗∗
im,s))]
(C.3)
with Ψs(zˆ) =
∫ zˆ
0
ψs(z
′|z, h)dz′ denoting the cdf of ψs. The term Πl∈ιδlΠm∈(λs−1∩λs)\ι(1−
δm) of ρ
co
λs−1→λs
expresses the probability that a firm suffers demand shocks in all
markets ι ⊂ λs−1 ∩ λs and does not suffer shocks in the remaining countries of
λs−1∩λs. In order to stay active in λs−1∩λs the firm has to re-enter markets ι and not
leave any of the remaining markets endogenously. The re-entry probability is given
by Πl∈ι(1−Ψs(z
∗
il,s)), and the non-endogenous exit probability by Πm∈ι(1−Ψs(z
∗∗
im,s)).
Hence, Ek[Πl∈ιδl(1−Ψs(z
∗
il,s))Πm∈(λs−1∩λs)\ι(1−δm)(1−Ψs(z
∗∗
im,s))] denotes the prob-
ability that the firm defaults at ι ⊂ λs−1∩λs but still ends up being active at λs−1∩λs
in the next period. Adding up this term for all ι in the power set P (λs−1 ∩ λs) we
add up the probabilities of all possible transitions from λs−1 to λs that keep the
firm active in λs−1 ∩ λs, i.e. we get ρ
co
λs−1→λs
. Accordingly, we get ρenλs−1→λs = 1 if
λs\(λs−1 ∩ λs) = ∅ and
ρenλs−1→λs = Ek,ψs [Πl∈λs\(λs−1∩λs)(1−Ψs(z
∗
il,s))Πm∈{1,...,n}\(λs∪λs−1)Ψs(z
∗
im,s)] (C.4)
else. The only possibility that the firm decides to enter all markets λs\(λs−1∩λs) is
that its current productivity zs overshoots all entry cut-off values of those markets
z∗il,s, l ∈ λs\(λs−1 ∩ λs). This is expressed by the first product. At the same time
it must hold that the firm does not enter any markets outside λs. This is partly
reflected by the second product. We restrict the second product to {1, . . . , n}\(λs∪
λs−1) ⊂ {1, . . . , n}\λs as the no-entry condition for markets λs−1\(λs−1 ∩ λs) is
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already implemented by ρexλs−1→λs . The last factor of ρλs−1→λs is given by ρ
ex
λs−1→λs
=
1 if λs\(λs−1 ∩ λs) = ∅ or else by:
ρexλs−1→λs =
∑
ι∈P (λs\(λs−1∩λs))
Ek,ψs [Πl∈ιδlΨt(z
∗
il,s)Πm∈(λs\(λs−1∩λs))\ι(1− δm)Ψs(z
∗∗
im,s)].
(C.5)
Either the firm exits markets ι ∈ λs\(λs−1 ∩ λs) by exogenous shocks and does not
find re-entry profitable (product over l), or it decides to exit markets ι ∈ λs\(λs−1∩
λts) endogenously (product over m). Applying (C.1)-(C.5) we can trace ρλs back
to ρλt :
ρλs =
∑
λs−1∈Λ
ρλs−1ρλs−1→λs =
∑
λs−1∈Λ
( ∑
λs−2∈Λ
ρλs−2ρλs−2→λs−1
)
ρλs−1→λs
=
∑
λs−1∈Λ
( ∑
λs−2∈Λ
(
· · ·
∑
λt+1∈Λ
(∑
λt∈Λ
ρλtρλt→λt+1
)
ρλt+1→λt+2 · · ·
)
ρλs−2→λs−1
)
ρλs−1→λs ,
with ρλt = 1 in case λt constitutes the firms current set of destinations, or else
ρλt = 0.
Cut-Off Values
Lemma 14 ensures existence and uniqueness of cut-off values. Existence of cut-off
values follows from statement (i) and (ii): If a firm exits all markets for z → 0 and
enters all markets for z →∞ it must hold that there are values of z that trigger entry
z∗ij,t or exit z
∗∗
ij,t for every market j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Uniqueness of cut-off values follows
from monotonicity of firm expansion expressed in statement (iii): If a firm enters
country j at a certain current productivity z, then it also enters at all productivities
z′ ≥ z. Hence, there is a unique smallest value triggering entry z∗ij,t, respectively a
unique largest value z∗∗ij,t triggering exit for every market j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Lemma 14. Suppose fix costs F > 0 and f > 0 are sufficiently small. Consider a
firm in stage three of period t, i.e. it just received a new productivity draw zt and
has to decide which markets to leave or to enter. Then, fixing the firms demand
risks ki(δ) and its productivity outlook h(α), there is following correspondence of its
current productivity z and its expansion: (i) z → ∞ yields λt → {1, . . . , n}, (ii)
if the firm is not too optimistic about its perceived type (h, k), then z → 0 yields
λt → ∅ and (iii) z < z
′ implies λt(z) ⊂ λt(z
′).
Statement (i) claims that the firm will enter all markets λt = {1, . . . , n} if z is
sufficiently big. Consider an arbitrary market j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The firms per period
84
C. Firm Life Cycles in a Global Economy
operating profit πij,t(z, h, k) = maxq∈R+{rt(q)− wtτij
q
z
− Ekj [δ]f} from serving this
market consists of three components rt(q), −wtτijq/z and −Ekj [δ]f . Firm revenue
rt(q) is strictly positive. The first cost component −wtτijq/z vanishes as z tends
towards infinity. Thus, rt(q)−wtτijq/z is strictly positive and it is possible to choose
f > 0 such that also πij,t is strictly positive. As the firm only switches to a new
productivity level if it dominates its current productivity, we have ψs+1(πij,s+1) ≥
ψs(πij,s) for all s ≥ t. Hence, also the continuation operating profit from serving
market j is strictly positive,
∑
s≥tEkj ,ψs [(1 − δ)
sπij,s] > 0. Again choosing F > 0
sufficiently small, we end up with strictly positive total profits from entering market
j, Πij,t > 0 (see formula (III.8)). As entering a new market does not only change
firm profits, but decreases the firms default probability at the same time, Πij,t > 0
is a sufficient property for entry. Hence, j ∈ λt. As this holds for arbitrary j ∈
{1, . . . , n} it follows λt = {1, . . . , n}. Statement (ii) claims that the firm will exit all
markets λt = ∅ if z is sufficiently small. This statement is restricted to sufficiently
pessimistic perceived types (h, k). If the firm is very optimistic about its future
productivity evolution and demand stability, potential future gains could outweigh
losses in present periods and the firm would stay active, i.e. λt 6= ∅. Hence, there
possibly exists a region of perceived types (h, k) without endogenous exit for some
markets j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. However, there exist endogenous exit cut-off values for
all markets if the firm is not too optimistic about (h, k). If the firm faces very
high demand risks Ekj [δ] → 1 within all countries j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then its default
probability ρλt−1∅ also tends towards one. From f > 0 it follows that z → 0 yields
negative per period operating profits πij,t < 0 on all markets j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence,
the firm will prefer to exit all markets and turn inactive endogenously in stage three,
rather than realizing negative per period operating profits πij < 0 in stage four and
then default due to exogenous demand shocks in stage five. This is the extreme case,
where endogenous exit occurs independent from the future productivity evolution
h. However, endogenous exit can also occur if the default probability is not as
drastic. Consider a firm that is not very optimistic about its productivity evolution
h. If it expects to default before its current productivity increased sufficiently in
order to balance the initial negative per period operating profits, it will maximize its
total profits by turning inactive immediately. Hence there exists a region of values
of (h, k) that guarantees the existence of exit cut-off values z∗∗ij,t for all markets
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Statement (iii) ensures monotonicity, i.e. if a firm finds it profitable
to enter market j at current productivity level z, then it would also enter market
j at all dominating current productivity levels z′ > z. Let ι ⊂ {1, . . . , n} denote
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the subset of markets that the firm does not serve and let σ : ι → ι denote the
permutation that orders the markets l ∈ ι according to their entry cut-off values,
i.e. σ(l) < σ(m) yields z∗iσ(l),t < z
∗
iσ(m),t. In terms of σ, it is straight forward to prove
monotonicity of market entry. Monotonicity holds if increasing z does not alter σ.
This is true as varying z while holding (h, k) fix affects Πiλa,t only via changing
per period operating profits πil,t directly. Those profits are strictly increasing in z.
Hence, leapfrogging of cut-off values is not possible. Monotonicity of market exit
follows from the same arguments by replacing ι ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with the markets that
the firm serves and σ : ι → ι with the permutation that orders those markets such
that σ(l) < σ(m) yields z∗∗iσ(l),t < z
∗∗
iσ(m),t.
Free Entry Condition
The free entry condition closes the model by pinning down the mass of entrants M et
in every period t ≥ 1 along the balanced growth path. Existence and uniqueness
of a general equilibrium with a positive mass of entrants M et > 0 follows from
Lemma 15 via choosing a value K > 0 in between limMet→∞Emet [Πi∅,t] = 0 and
limMet→0Emet [Πi∅,t] > 0. Similar to Lemma 14, existence of M
e
t follows from (i) and
(ii) and uniqueness from (iii).
Lemma 15. Given the restrictions on f and F from Lemma 14, the relationship of
mass M et and expected total profit Emet [Πi∅,t] in stage one (i.e. before observing the
first productivity draw z0) fulfills: (i) M
e
t → ∞ yields Emet [Πi∅,t] → 0, (ii) M
e
t = 0
yields Emet [Πi∅,t] > 0, and (iii) M˜
e
t < M
e
t yields Emet [Π˜i∅,t] > Emet [Πi∅,t].
Statement (i) claims that as the mass of entrants M et approaches infinity, their
expected total profit Emet [Πi∅,t] approaches zero. As there is only a finite mass of
workers L > 0 in every country i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, increasing the mass of entrants
M et without bound pushes the expected labor share l = q/z of each firm towards
zero. Either a subset of firm types of positive measure decides to turn active, or a
Lebesgue zero set of firm types turns active. The first case implies an infinite mass
of new incumbents, hence, the labor share of each individual firm equals zero. The
second case also incorporates finite masses of new incumbents and yields positive
actual labor shares in this case. However, as the ex-ante probability to turn active is
zero, ex-ante expected labor shares equal zero as well. Hence, expected production
quantities q converge towards zero in either case and expected firm revenue rt(q)
vanishes. This yields negative per period operating profits πij,t = maxq∈R+{rt(q)−
wtτijq/z−Ekj [δ]f}. Thus, new born firms will not find it optimal to invest in market
86
C. Firm Life Cycles in a Global Economy
entry and decide to turn inactive generating zero total profits. Statement (ii) claims
that if the mass of entrants M et converges towards zero, their expected total profit
Emet [Πi∅,t] becomes strictly positive. By choice of f and F (see proof of Lemma 14)
there exist some values of z0 that yield strictly positive firm profits. Possibly there
exist some values of z0 that yield zero profits, but negative profits are not possible
as the firm can always decide to turn inactive. Hence, expected total profits are
strictly positive. Statement (iii) ensures monotonicity, i.e. the larger the mass of
entrants M et the smaller the expected total profit Emet [Πi∅,t]. This result is driven
via two channels. Consider a firm (z, h, k). As M et rises, the mass of competitors
increases. Hence, the workforce l = q/z of firm (z, h, k) shrinks. This reduces
q, and consequently operating profits πij,t(z, h, k) decline. Operating profits affect
total profits Πiλt(z, h, k) =
∑
s≥t
∑
λs∈Λ
Ek,ψs [ρλs(z, h, k)πiλs(z, h, k) − |λs\λs−1|F ]
directly via πiλs(z, h, k) and indirectly via ρλs(z, h, k). The probabilities ρλs(z, h, k)
give rise to the probability of firm expansion
∑
λt⊃λt−a
ρλt(z, h, k) or firm shrinkage∑
λt⊂λt−a
ρλt(z, h, k). Both, πiλt(z, h, k) and
∑
λt⊃λt−a
ρλt(z, h, k) are downsized by
a decline in operating profits πij,s(z, h, k). Hence, increasing the mass of entrants
M et reduces total profits Πiλt(z, h, k) for any firm (z, h, k) and thus ex-ante expected
total profits Emet [Πi∅,t] shrink.
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